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OHAPTER I 
THE MORALITY OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE ACCORDING TO THUCYDIDES 
~~IOU ydp ~' 4pl~~' 4~oa(vu~al Idp~ox« Zeu' 
dvlpo" e3~' 4v ~'v x«~d OOUA&OV ~~«p lAnolV • 
..... OdZ ••• l' 17. 322-32.3. 
When the Greek world emerged trom its dark age. about the 
middle ot the elghth century betore Ohrist, ahe was dotted with 
many small clty atates up and down her coast. and In the interior 
lands surrounding the Aegean. The sun ot those wldely ruling 
monarchs whose heroic deeds Homar had sung bad already set beneath 
the political horizon. A ~lad ot tiny 1ndependent po11t1es had 
risen in its plaoe and would dominate the h1stor1oal scena tor 
some oenturies to come. 
Despite thetr ins1gnifioant size, theae po11t1cal bod1ea 
managed to produoe one of the truly great civ1lizationa of the 
human race. W1th their intense mi11tary and oommero1al r1valry, 
they planted colon1es from one end ot the known world to the 
other--trom Slnope on the Ruxine to Balinua 1n Slcl1y. And, 
though they were contlnually at war with one another, still they 
provided within their midst a spawning ground for some of the 
tinest artists, writers, and thtnkers ot all tlme--men 11ke Plato, 
Ph1di.s, P1ndar. H.rodo~u •• Sophocles, Aeschylus, Demosthenes, 
Polygnotul, Aristophanest Socrates, and Thucydides. 
One dominant note runs tlwoughout these centuries of Greek 
greatnesst the jealously guarded b •. eueepta., whioh we frequently 
translate "freedom." This was the distinctive trait of the city 
state and of its people. As an ideal, it inspired the polity to 
aSlert its own independent claim to greatness and inspired the 
individual c1tizens to reach out tor an acme of culture in all 
fields. And later, when Greek ingenuity was becoming exhausted; 
it would serve as the tragio flaw that would destroy their civi-
lisation through. improvident internal dissension. But now. in 
the fifth century, the era with which we shall be concerned, 
e>..tuetp{a. expressed in one word the spirit of the times. 
It 1s important for us, then, it we wish to understand the 
temperament of this Greek people, that we know precisely what 
their trad1tional spirit embodied. The word f>..eugepla., as we have 
remarked, can be translated briefly as "freedom" or ttin4-ependence." 
But it meant much more to the Greeks. It embraced not merely the 
concept ot political autonom¥, though this was an important factor 
1n itself. Nor d1d it necessarily signify that a citizen governed 
hi.maelt bJ' a more or less democI"atic torm of goveI"nm.ent. Rather 
it meant that in the way the oity state was go~erned-.whether 
oligarohy, tyranny, or democI"acy •• the rights of the individual 
were respected. Each man was a full-fledged member of his state,l 
•• • 
lNot all adult malee. ot oourse, were citizens in the Indi. 
vidual .tates, but only those who possessed the proper birth and 
property qualifications. 
.3 
not Just a subject Oa!' IIlave ot the pollty_ '!'hua lllueep(a. included 
both. the 111t8matlonal autonomy 01' external Hlations c.t a atate 
and the domostlc pollcT. where apblt~ governm$nt was excluded 
in favor of a polity ruled hi la •• ~.$pectlng the dlgn1t1 ot eaoh 
oltlaen. a.neela one all .. embt-aolng apUttt nx-e tound both .. 
stimulant tor and a satlafaotlon ot man'. higher lnatincta and 
oapabl11tl ..... 1n ~ •• dol1l ot opportunity and in r&a~ot tor the 
achieve.nt. ot the lndlvldual. 'both In the oa8e ot state. and 
men-a 
!hi. tradition ot cleue.p/a. ... tl~7 embedded 1n the minda 
and bearts ot tn. Gr •• k pGOple. To pH .. ". It and all that lt 
stood for. they bad tought nwaeN'WI wa.t-s as.1nat domestto despots 
and. against otbel' oity atat •• whlch had, sought to enol'Oaoh on 
thetr libertiea. ID the opening year. of the fifth o.nt~, when 
the bubarlan armi •• tl"Olfl 'eraia had oY.r~ thel!' land, t11. G~eek 
people had .tood tog.th •• to waN o£t the eWead _nac. of 6oule{CI.. 
1fIbleb. waa tbJ.'l6aten1ns to engulf the whole or Hell.a • .3 POll'gett1ng 
• ". • • J • • • ••••• _ 
.. 
J;,oUAllo., wh10h 1s utruall,. tl'8nalated a.s "alavery" oX' ttenw 
al.av_t. b ~.al17 considered .a the. opposite of 4AI\1elplu. 
Gonte%' "'''itt, Atha9&!D ~b!!t'\ Meta, 1n 'the place 01".4 a 
.ape.taU,. pap . • 
their individual differenoes in the face ot a threat to their 
dearly prized freedom. they had battled the foreigh invader in 
unison. 
4 
Against the background ot this weighty traditIon, Athens 
arose a fe. years later and enslaved over half the Greek world. 
~ranstorm1ng the original naval confederacy of Delos into an 
Athenian Emplre,4 sbe acted oontrary to all that had been held 
saored in Hellas up to that time. Righteous indignation was 
poured forth in abundance by the treedo~lovlng Greeks against 
this moral abomination; and, to relieve the oppressed states, an 
international war was inaugurated which wauld drag on for twenty-
seven yeus. 
To Thucydides, the supposedly abJe.ct1v. historian of the 
Athenian Empire, this oontradiction cried tor a solutIon. how 
could any sincerely religious Greek people rise to succeas by en-
slaving the1r tellow Hellenes? ~o reconoile this seem1rlg d1 ..... 
parity, he returned to the question ot a moral Justifioation tor 
the Athenian Empire several times during his narratlve.5 But he 
dId not push his inquiry openly or in his own name, because his 
• 
40Ur present notion ot empire was perhaps too refined for the 
ancient Greek. 'ApX~ was the term employed to deSignate the Athe~ 
nian power. Its real meaning ean be ascertained it we advert to 
the fact that it was the active concept corresponding to the pas-
sive OouA£lc and hence took away ~A.£ua£pia.. Confer de Romilly, 
ibid., 19-20. 
- $B,g., I, 15-71J II, 60-64; v, 8$-111; VI, 82-81, to mention 
a few of the more prominent places. 
5 
work was supposed to be a striot chronologioal retailing of even~ 
Rather he pursued his InvestigatIons through his charaoters, let--
ting their V&l~ious speeohes speak tor h~-the Spartans and their 
allies as the prosecutors. the Athenians as the defendants. This 
method for proposing the argUments tor both sides has left us, 
throughout the books of Thucydides. moral accusations and apologi., 
as in abundance) but it has also lett us wondering what the per-
sonal opinIons of Thuoydldes were in the matte~~ 
This limitation. namely our not being able to assign 8.r!1 
statements definitely to Thucydides on the morality of the Athe-
nian Empire. forces us to proceed to our goal in this thesis in a 
roundabout way. In our treatment of Thucydldean passages where 
a justifioation tor the Empire ls attempted, we must carefully 
distinguish between Thucydldes and the Athenian slde as presented 
by--and not necessarily subscribed to by--Thucydides. What will 
this distinction mean practically in our present oonsiderat1on? 
Simply that we must be oontent at first w1th skimm1ng the surface 
of the text, confining ourselves to the Athenian observations on 
the morality ot their empire. Later,. when we ,halre t};tlly grasped 
the import of the Athenian position, we can attempt to determine 
whether or not the position 1s also Thucydides'. 
Theretore, keeping in mind the dominEnt tradition ot ~Aeo­
e&p{a in the fifth century and the peculiar, reoondite condition 
of the historian in the present context, let us commence our 
study of the morality ot that oontradiotion which history has 
6 
labelled the Athenian Empire. Perhaps the most oonoise statement 
on behalf ot Athens is oontained in the first book of Thuoydides. 
beginning in ohapter seventy.tive. Here some Athenian oitizens, 
who happened to be in Sparta on business in 432 when the ohiet 
oouncil ot the Lacedaemonians was debating whether or not to de-
clare war against Athens, sum up in brief compass their apologia 
tor their empire: 
• • • do we deserve to be regarded with this excessive jealousy by the Hellenes just on account or the empire 
.e possess? And indeed we did not aoquire this empire 
by toroe, but only atter you had retused to continue to 
oppose Yb.at was lett 01' the barbarian toroea, and the 
allies came to us and of their own aooord asked us to 
aasu.m.e the leadership. It waa under the oompulsion of 
oiroumstanoes that we were driven to advance our .~ 
pire to 1ts present state, influenoed chiefly by tear, 
then by honor also, and lastly by self-interest as well; 
and atter .e had onoe inourzaed the hatred 01' most 01' 
our allies, and several ot them had already revolted 
and been reduoed to subjeotion, and when you were no 
longer friendly as before but suspioious and at va.ri-
anee with us. it no longer seemed sate to risk re-
laxing our hold. For all seoeders would have gone over 
to you. And no man is to be blamed for making the-most 
01' his agvantages when it is a question of the gravest 
dangers. 
This short, blunt paragraph is the Athenian case. Other 
passages may introduce ramitioations ot the ideas here expre$sed. 
but they add nothing to the essential simplicity of this argu-
ment. We shall rely on it for our po1nt ot departure, bringing 
in other texts only where neoessary to ola rlty expressions not 
fully developed. 
61• lS. l-~. The translation of Thuoydides used throughout 
this thes 8 will be that at Charles Forster Smith from the tOGh 
serles. 
7 
This justifioation falls easily into a threefold division, 
based on ohrono1ogical as well as logioa1 oonsiderations. At its 
inoeption, the Athenian Empire was not aoquired by force; but the 
allies of Athens freely and of their own aocord asked her to as-
sume control of the naval oonfederacy at Delos. Seoondly, al-
though this oonfederacy was at the time a far cry trom the later 
Empire, yet the g~adual transition from confederacy to Empire was 
effeoted only under compulsion of circumstances. Henoe the Athe-
nians inourred no guilt in this transitional stage. And then, 
finally, when Athens was faced with the harsh reality of the E~ 
pire in its full vigor, it was no long$r safe for her to relax 
her grip.-th1s would have been political suioide. Thus the Athe-
nians, through no fault ot their own, had oome into the possession 
ot this moral monster.7 
The tirst of the exouses proftered by the Athenians,:ram.elYI 
that the original oommand ot the De1ian contederacy was'not se- I 
cured by force, is a fact of history, valid as far as it "gpes. 
But its direct bearing on the case is minimal. The allies sub-
mitted to a confederacy on equal terms, not relinquishing their 
soveX'eignty in the least--a11 of this in complete accord with 
7 It i8 noteworthy that the Atheni,ans in the course of the 
book never attempt to claim that their empire 1s entirely just. 
Perioles himself adm1ts to the Athenians tp,at "the empire you 
hold 1s a tyranny" (II, 63, 2). Rather their efforts to justify 
their aotions are always in terms ot oiroumstanoes,' 'inot the deeds 
themselves. 
8 
their tradi tional ~Ae\)eep( a.. No one woul'd claim that the io1 tial 
stage of what w~s later to prove the Empire was unjust; and Athens 
is by her first assertion simply beginning on the rIght foot 
rhetorically by stat1ng an obvious fact with which her audience 
will undoubtedly agree. Thus this excuse in itself does not 
amount to a moral Justification of the Athenian Empire. but mere-
ly to a re .... assertion of the original innocuous nature ot the power 
held by the Athenians. 
The next point of the Athenian defense. namely the transi-'~ 
tton trom oontederacy to empire because of the presa ot olrcunt-fl 
~l 
stances, would seem to be the orux ot the question. For here, In 
the gradual evolution to imperial power, the rights of the allies 
began to be intringed upon and ~Ae\)eep{« 1n its true po11ttcal 
significance to be rejeoted. If the Athenians were actualll 
forced (XCL'tT)VCLyxciaew.cv] to take t.his course ot action, then any 
olaas of immorality could hardly be proved against them. But, 
it they were not striotly forced 1nto these aot1ons, their apol-
ogia becomes invalid; and they stand convioted as impious. The 
point on which their whole case rests is the necessity of clro~ 
stances. It such necessity was really present and only If it was 
really present, oan their mode of conduot be justified. 
The third point of the apologia 18 fundamentally a 2os~ 
faotWll argument: given the Athenian Empire, what can we do with 
it? Again a form ot neceSSity, here the need tor selt-preservat1~ 
steps in and d1etate. that the 'pX~ be held onto. It Is now too 
9 
dangero~s to let go. Th1s would allow tormer subjeots to release 
their pent-up hatred against the Athenians} and Athens, deprived 
of her tormer armor, would be surrounded on all sides by enemies 
eager to taste her blood. 
The torce of this final point also rests on the evidenoe of 
oircumstanoes. Everyone listening to the Athenian envoys would 
be willing to concede that th.1.s third point, like the first one, 
1s undeniably true. Athens was sitting on a powder keg and could 
not aftord to get off. Hence, from the Athenian pOint of view 
at least, necessity was once agein forcing their hand. They had 
no desire to run roughshod over the moral traditions of their 
people, but they had no choice. 
And so the Athenian case seeW,& to hang together rather solid-
ly. Charges of immorality are hemmed in on all sides by the blank 
wall of necessity. And this necessity, in at least the first and 
third points of the Athenian apologia, is supported by ihoontesta-
ble evidenoe. 
But, as Thucyd1des himself realized. this case is not on so 
ti~m a foundation as may appear at first glance. When one in-
speots somewhat more closely the nature of the necessity adduoed 
as excusing. the moral validIty of the Athenian justification be-
gins to topple. Let us take another look at the exact wording 
of some portions of the above-quoted speech to the spartan ooun-
cil: 
It was under the compulsion ot circULwtances that we 
were driven to advanoe our empire to its present state, 
influenoed chiefly by fear, then by honor also, and 
lastly by selt-interest as well; and after We had onoe 
inourred tho hatred of most of our allies ••• it no 
longer seeme~ safe to risk relax1r-g our hold •••• 
And no man is to be blamed for making the most of his 
advan~ages when it is s. que~tlon of the gravest dan-
gers. 
10 
Are the Athenia.ns here talking of necessity or of expediency? It 
would seem trom their very words--honor, self-interestJ advan+-~­
that a large part of wha.t they are oalling necessity is in fact 
simply pragmatio neoessity or expedienoy. Thus it would appear 
that the Athenians were not foroed in the strict sense ot the 
term. but rather swayed by considerationa of gain and loss. as 
they themselves here seem to admit. Hence their necessity is 
not what we would ea.ll true moral necessity, and their attempt 
to justify their aations 1s to this extent based upon an unsolid 
foundation. 
At this point in our argument, however, a whole new area 
in Thucydides is opened to view. ForJ in the pages of his history 
we find not just faots and not just a thinly veiled spologia for 
the Empire. but also a complete new soheme of morality on whioh 
the justification can be based. Onoe again, we cannot pos1tively 
state that Thuoydides personally held this new morality. but only 
that he puts its prin.ciples into the mouths of the spokesmen for 
the Athenians. On the basis of this new morality, the neoessities 
or expedienctes mentioned abOve beoome valid apologias for the 
11 
rectitude of the dpX~. 
Though this thesia is not primarily philosophical in charac-
ter, it will be helpful to consider quite brietly what the Thuey-
didean/or rather Athenian tenets ot morality were. First ot all, 
the toundation stone ot the new morality was human nature. not 
human nature as it ought to be. but human nature as it ls. Thus 
the strong natural motives inherent in the human being were canon-
ized and morality put on a positivist toundation. Thus, when the 
Athenians built up their Empire because ot tear, honor, and gain, 
they were but yielding to the universal necesaity ot this human 
nature I xp~od~evo, ~n dv9p~e(q ~dOt,.9 And they were blameless 
in such action because "nothing is remarkable or inconsistent with 
human nature in what .e have done."lO 
The oardinal prinoiples ot this existential human nature 
seem to have been: "no man is to be blmed tor making the most ot 
his advantages when there is a question ot the gravest dangers n1l 
and "it i8 always the established rule that the weaker is kept 
down by the stronger."12 Thus we find the Athenians in 416 ex-
horting the Melians not to urge the old hypocritical claims of 
9I, 76, 3. 
1°1, 76, a. 
llI, 7$, 5. 
12I, 76, 2. 
12 
morality and justice13._"which no one, when opportunity offered 
of seouring something by main strength, ever yet put before toroe 
and abstained from taking advantage. ,,14 The Athenians wanted to 
base their mores on more realistic oonsiderations. l $ 
It is not the aim ot this thesis to refute the philosophical 
foundation ot this argument. But it has been necessary to see 
why we oan term the Athenian apologia a moral justification in 
the true sense. Granted the revised oonception of moral neoessity 
the Athenian defense can beoome valid in the moral order. We 
shall prescInd, therefore, from any philosophical discussion of 
its posItIvist basis and ask: is 1t valid in the moral order? 
By posIng our question in this way, we pass from the philos-
ophioal realm to that of historical and literary tact. Was there 
present in the ooncrete ciroumstances surrounding the development 
of the Athenian Empire trom the naval confederaoy at Delos a 
13v, 89-90. 
141, 76, 2. 
15Thl• moral theory is not deduoed from isolated instanoes 
in the text. Many passages besides I, 75-77 and the others oited 
express similar opinions--e.g., III, 45 and 82-85, IV, 61; v, 85-
111) VI, 82.87. Confer also Paul Shorey, "On the Implicit Ethios 
and Psychology of Thuoydides,u Transagtlons ot the American Phi-
lological Association, XXIV (18~l', 6 -SS, a!though 'thIs artTOIe 
seems In places to overstep the limits of the evidence and also 
assigns opinions directly to Thucydides which should be more 
properly reterred to his charactera. To see how aocurately Thucy-
dldesdesor1bes the current moral standards of much of Athens, 
confer Paul F. Conan, 8.1., The Ultimate Norm ot Mora1itz in ~he 
Trasedies ot Sophocles, (UnpUEIisned laster's !nesla; toyoTa---
Un!verslty;-CElcago, !954), espeoially Chapter II, pp. 7-25. 
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necessity which forced the Athenians to take the course ot action 
that they did? Or was this necessity merely a product of the 
mind ot the Athenian Thucydides, who has gilded his nal~~ative--
as Corntord and others charge--omitting certain tacts to establish 
his thesis ot necessity and, as a consequence, the actual validity 
of the moral justification? 
This, then, is the problem of our thesis. Is the Thucydidean 
apologia for the Athenian Empire valid in the light of history? 
Was necessity such as he portrays really present in the adjacent 
circumst~~ces; or did he exercise his critical jud~nt to avoid 
mentioning embarrassing events which would dislodge his precon-
ceived conclusion? In other words, 1s Thueydides good history in 
this conneotion; or was he indulging in a literary fantasy and 
shaping the facts to soothe the downhearted Athenians after the 
fall of their oity?16 
• We will have no little difficulty in answering this question. 
Almost all succeeding historians of hlus period have utilized 
16That the historian wrote after 404 B.C. and the fall ot 
Athens is attested to by his words in V, 26. 1, where ~e refers 
to the twenty-seven year duration of the PAlopo~~esian War. 
I wish to aoknowledge my indebtedness to the following works 
for helping me to formulate the problem or this thesis: Francis 
MaoDonald Cornford, ThUCjdideS ~th1stor1ous (London, 1907); 
David Grena, Man in ftIs rIae ( ieago, 19>0), especially pp. 3-
69: de Rom11ly, tbrd:;-Uaurioe Hutton. "Thucydides and Hi8tory,rt 
Proceed1nss and !ransactions of the Rozal Soc1et~ ot Canada, 3rd 
SerIes, ! (1~), Section fr,~2;:245. ---
Thucydides as their chier source. Hence they oould hardly be ex-
pectod to serve as oriteria tor his objeotivity. And, unfortuna~ 
1y, the work ot Thuoydides is the only literary historioal reoord 
of the times in question.17 Henoe, to verity Thucydides f objec-
tivity on the matter of the Athenian Empire, we must turn to some 
other non-literary historical source. 
For this source, I have chosen the Greek coinage ot the 
period, issued by the various cities subjeot to imperial Athens. 
The scienoe of numismatics has proved peculiarly valuable in 
other instances tor giving continuous, unbiased inSights into the 
history of a people.18 The emblems on the ooins can tell us some-
thing ot the ruling class in the state at the time; the monetary 
standard employed in striking the metal pieces can reveal some-
thing of the cor~~rcia1 relations ot the city; and even a laouna 
in a well-authenticated series can sometimes indicate to the ob-
17Namely 480-411. There are, of course, certain chroniclers 
(conter Felix Jacoby,AtthisJ OXford, 1949) and also a slight 
overlapping in the accounts ot Herodotus and or Xenophon, not to 
mention oooasional hints by Aristophanes, but nothing oontinuous 
or sustained. Plutaroh. who also treats of many ot these years 
in his iiV~S, relies heavIly, but not completely, upon the Thuey-
didean ex. 
lBscholars have been greatly indebted to the work of Seltman, 
who revolutionized our knowledf~ or Athenian history from the 
years 594-561 a tew decades ago tbrOU~l his tireless research 
with coins. There are also other examples of history beine aided 
through numismatIcs, among the more reoent of these might be in-
cluded the work of May on the coins ot Aenos and that ot Head on 
the earliest coins ot BoeotIa. We will have occasion later in 
the thesis to reter to these latter works in our diSCUSSion ot 
the history or these areas. 
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server a temporary loss of sovereigil~Y or some s1l1lilal'" political 
calamity. Thus I hope the n~~smatlos may be able to throw some 
light on our present subject, namely the necessity attenc1.ant on 
the formation and continuance of the Athenian :Bm:pire. 
Coins and finanoial records, at' coul"sa, cannot 'Gel1 us the 
whole story. But the oontinuous and faithful aocounts that they 
have left us in many instances point up an objective historioal 
narrative to which we can compare Thucydides for conformity. For 
example, if' we can glean from this archaeological source certain 
salient historical fac'cs ",hioh Thucydidea should have knoW!), and 
should have ineorpol"ated into his history, then we may leg'iti.m.ate-
ly ask why he made such an omission--especially it the facts in 
question might have some bearing on the justification of the 
Athenian Empire and the necessity connected with it. And, if we 
can find through our investigations no such telling omissions, 
then we may have added substantiation for the Thuoydidean apologis 
from Ell other historioal field. 
Our purpose, then, in the next four chapters of this thesiS 
will be briefly to review the main faots of history touohing on 
the Athenian Empire in the years that Thucydides' narrative cover, 
~ly from 478 to 411. We shall use as our basic skeleton the 
texts of Thucydides dea.ling with the growth and maturity of' the 
empire; and we shall comment on and fill in with evidence from 
nunlisIttatics wherever possible. In this way we may hope to a.p-
proach. all objective view of the history of these years and of' 
16 
the Athenian Empire in general. For the moment then, in chapters 
two through five, we shall presoind trom all oonsiderations of 
morality and oonfine ourselves to a perusal of the two accounts 
of history. In the final chapter, we will once again return to 
our problem and, in the light ot the history seen, attempt some 
conolusions on the objective validity ot the Thucydidean apo1o-
g1a.19 
19It is difficult in suoh stUdies as these to promise a full 
solution to our problem. We may merely hope that our searoh may 
be profitable in pointing out the general direotion of an answer. 
We do not expeot a definitive. black-and-white proof statement 
that Thuoydides was highly biased in his treatment ot the Empire 
or that he was completely ObJective in his writings, we will be 
much more likely to uncover a more generic tendency towards 
either subjectivity or objectivity. 
We may al so in our last chapter add some few words on the 
question whether or not the contemporary Athenian code of morality 
was actually shared by Thuoydides.,. 
OHAPTER II 
THE HISTORY OF THE ATHENIAN EfiIPIRE: 478-454 B.a. 
In the sp~lng of the year 478 B.C •• the G~eeks were exulting 
in their newly found power. They had eftectively treed the main-
land in the preoeding August, when they had roundly trounced the 
Persian invaders at Plataea and at Mycale. Then, during the win-
ter months, the Athenian fleet had opened up the Dardanelles to 
Greek navigation by capturing Sestos. And now, an armada of Greek 
allies under Spartan leadership was preparing to set sail tor 
Cyprus to expel the Persian gar:risons trom the Greek oit"ies on 
that island. 
At this time the Spartan hegemony in Greeoe was an a.ccepted 
tact. Sparta, largely because ot her naturally military mode of 
lire, had been the on11 first-rank military po\Ye~ in Greece at 
the time ot the Persian invasion and, as a consequence, had as-
sumed a more than generous portion ot the fighting and adminis-
• 
trative roles in the Greek resistanoe. Just recently, in 479, 
it had been her general, Pausanlas, a member ot the royal family 
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of Sparta, who had engineered the brilliant victory at Plataea. 
It surprised no one, then, that the spartan ephors selected the 
same Pausanias to head the combined fleet of more than sixty 
allied vessels on the Cyprus campaign. 
The Cyprus expedition under Pausaniaa triumphed within an 
amazingly short time. So the fleet sailed north and took Byzan-
tium before the close of the summer. l These, in addition to his 
previous suooesses, turned the head of PausaniasJ and he began 
to entertain grandiose thoughts of making himself ruler of the 
whole Greek world. Though still Greek commander-in-chief, he 
adopted the external trappings of an oriental potentate--wearing 
eastern dress, observing Persian customs, and surrounding himself 
with a personal bodyguard seleoted from the Persian and EgyptIan 
prisoners taken at Byzantium. He gradually grew more and more 
insolent and oppressive towards the Greek officers under him. 
Finally, to make the situation thoroughly intole~able, he Initia~ 
a treasonable correspondenoe with Xerxes himself, in whioh he 
offered to help him overeome Greeoe. 
At this point, the ephors began to grow alarmed at the 
various reports reaching them from the Hellespont. So they 
summoned Pauaanias baok to sparta in the fall of 478 to stand 
lIt is impossible to substantiate this early tall of Byzan-
tium from its coinage because the city did not begin 1ssuing 
either her iron or silver currency until the clos1ng years of the 
fifth century. Conter Barclay Vincent Head, ~1storia Numorum. 
2nd edt (Oxford, 1911), pp. 266-267. 
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trial on the charges accumulated against him. In the official 
investigation which ensued, some of the lesser acousations against 
him were proved; but the more serious oount ot treason was not. 
At any rate, he was removed from command, but allowed to return 
to Byzantium in an unofficial capacity in the following sprIng. 2 
This scandal, following as it did soon after the disgrace of 
another Spartan general, Leotychldas, who had mismanaged the co~ 
bined Thessalian offensive in the previous year,3 sowed the seeds 
of discontent among the non-Peloponnesian allies. And ~~, dur-
ing the absence of Pausanlas, some ot the Ioniana suggested that 
the group appoint a new, non-Doric leader. The proposal was 
well reoeived by the majority ot tho aruy, most of whom were 
either Attic or Ionian; and an Athenian general was seleoted, who 
agreed to se~e as supreme oommander. 
Thus, in the sprIng of 477, when the new general sent out 
by the Spartans arrived, he tound the Athenian leadership an ao-
fr 
oompllshed taot. SuprIs1ng1y enough, he made no great protest 
aSouroes for thIs treatment of Pausanias and his management 
of the Spartan hegemony are Thucydides, I, 94-95. Herodotus, V, 32 
and VIII, 3. Bury, 322-326, The Cambr1dge Anoient HistorI. Edited 
by J. B. Bury, S. A. Cookt ~F: !. AdoooK, Vol. ~: "Athens, 478-401 B.C." (New York, 19271. 33-39J R. Wei1, "Das Mun~recht dar 
BYKMAXOI 1m eraten Attisohen Seebund," Ze1~sohrift ~ Numiamat1!, 
XXVIII (1910), 351-364. 
3The venalIty of some Spartan leaders when they esoaped from 
the imposed trugality of theIr home l1fe is notorious. Sparta 
allowed her people the use of only iron money, forbidding them 
gold and silver. But obviously alle did not extirpate all their 
latent desires for the finer metals. 
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over this turn of events. Sparta, essentially a land power, was 
generally oontent as long as her affairs were not menaced on the 
pelopoIDlese and was growing tired of the prolonged sea campaign 
abroad. So she and the rest of the Peloponnesians used this as 
an exouse for a quiet withdrawal, thus unconsoiously setting the 
stage for the future triumphs of Athens. 
After the departure of the Peloponnesian forces, Athens and 
her al11es carried on the campaign against the Persians by the~ 
selves. It was at this point that there came into being the 
Delian confederaoy--that organization whioh was later to blossom 
forth into the Athenian Empire.4 Thuoydides desoribes its birth 
in this fashion: 
After the Athenians had sucoeeded in this way to 
the leadership over the allies, who freely ohose them 
on aooount of their hatred of Pausanias, they assessed 
the amount of their contributions, both for the states 
whioh were to furnish money for the war against the 
Ba:r-barians and for those ltlioh were to furnish. ships, 
the avo.ed objeot being to avenge t hemselvea for wh"at 
the:' had sutfered by ravaging the King's te:r-ritory. 
And it waa then that the Athenians f1:r-st establIshed 
the office of Hellenio treasure:r-s, who reoeived the 
tribute, tor so the oontribution of money waa termed. 
The amount of the tribute first assessed was four 
hundred and sixty talonts, and the treasury of the 
allies ~as Delos, where the meetings ware held in the 
temple.> 
4The date of the formation of the Delian confederacy is dis-
puted. It probably took place sometime between the winter of 
478/7 and the following summer. Confer the chronologioal tables 
in A. W. Gomme, A Historical commenta~ on Thucydides (3 vols. to 
dateJ Oxford, 19~5-t955', t, 39~J Merr t;-A. %. ~., tIl, 175 ff. 
5r, 96. 
The nature of the Athenian powep at this time was "a leadership 
over allies who were autonomous and took part in the deliberations 
of common assemb11es.,,6 
Thus the Delian confederacy was at first a quite innocuous 
union of tree Greek states whioh, under Athenian direction, sought 
to reooup their losses in the Persian invasions by despoiling the 
lands of the Great King. But it is not this state of "pruaitlve 
innooence" that we are chiefly interested in, but rather how this 
free union became warped into the subsequent Athenian E~~ire. We 
wish, at this stage in our narrative, to observe the tranmtion 
between oonfederacy and empire and to see how the early pu~ose 
ot pursuing the Persians was subverted into the later purpose of 
Athens eonquering her own allies. 
LikeWise, starting with the formation of the confederacy in 
478/7, we can begin to trace in the larger states at least the in-
fluence of their po1itioal upon their eoonomic life. Once Athens 
had gained control of the oonfederation of the allies and had 
started to levy tribute from most of the cities of the Aegean 
world, this military influence began to carry over into the eeon. 
6I, 91, 1. The beginnings and the original purpose of the 
Delian league may be found treated in the following secondary 
sources: Bury, 328-3291 Eug~ne CavaigQ&c, Etudes sur l'H1stoire 
Financ1dre d t Athenes au Cinqui~me S1eo1e rPar!s,~OD), pp. 184-
!86~ Percy ~araner. A nIstorz of AncIent Coinage (Oxford, 1918), 
p. 286; J. A. O. Larsen, "The COnstItution and Original Purpose 
ot the De11an League," narval~ Studies in Classioa1 PhilolofY, 
LI (1940), 175-213J Wei!, 353-3>4. --. , 
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ornic lite. Athens, previously a strong merchant power, now be-
came vastly stronger. And cities once able to compete with her 
commercially were forced to submit to her economic tyranny as 
w811·as her political domination. 
This state of affairs, however, was not altogether e~ident 
at first. The power ot Athens in the beginning was undefined and 
seemed to be somewhat slight: and so neither her political nor 
her economic mastery was felt at once. But, as we shall see, 
this power grew by constant exercise; and the gradual Athenian 
ascendanoy in the oontrol of trade can be seen in the fact that 
many cities were forced to switoh to her Attio-Euboio mint stan-
dard and many more were driven to give up the striking of coins 
completely before the onslaught of the all-powerful Athenian 
tetradrachm.. Naturally many of the small oi ties, 'II hioh did not 
ooin a.nyway, were not influenoed by this growth of power; but, 
• in the large:r cities, as the stranglehold of Athens grows over the 
Greek world, we oan watoh ooinage flicker and die out in many 
formerly wealthy states. 
It might be profitable at this point, before resuming our 
narrative, to bring to the attention of the reader the relative 
validity or cogency of our evidenoe. Most of our material will 
be takenfitom arohaeolo';ioal findings, disooveries of hoards and 
ot isolated COins, that 1s, the complete find1ngs to date whioh 
enable the num1smatlcian to attempt a true soienoe of ancient 
coinage. But, beoause of the nature of our topiC, the evidenoe 
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which we shall draw from this field will be chiefly negat1ve--i.e., 
when the Athenians tightened their hold on th~ Aegean area, the 
various issues of coinage disappeared. This negative evidence is 
supplied by the fact that no coins have yet been disoovered to 
fill in the contemporary gaps of the otherwise oomplete oOinage 
series of these cities. 
Such evidence in itself is tenuous. The fact that at this 
moment we possess no coins r~om a oertain period for a given city 
does not mean that we will not find such coins in the future. 
Hence any individual pieoe of negative evidence is liable to be 
reversed at any time; and thus any individual statement made in 
the course of this thesis with regard to the present state ot 
numismatic evidenoe is always open to turther revision based on 
new disooveries. But, while the individual pieces ot evidenoe 
may not be partioularly cogent, still the over-all picture pos-
sesses a cumulative validity that is almost overwhelming. It we 
consider the present highly advanced state7 ot Greek numismatics 
and see how the coinage ot every Greek oity ot respectable size 
is known in some detail for the period covering the last six cen-
turies before the Christian era, we oannot help but notioe the 
laounae observable in the case of fith-century ooinage--gaps so 
7When we speak of the soienoe of numismatics being in an 
advanoed state, we speak from the point ot view ot the classicist. 
For our present purposes, we can glean muoh trom the present state 
ot the soienoe. But, trom the point of view ot the numismatioian, 
much remains to be done in clarifying the many details of his 
broad field. 
universal among the Ionian Greeks and others affiliated with 
Athens that they cannot be insignifloant. 8 Coins from these 
cities we have in abundance for- the sixth and fourth centuries. 
The well-nigh complete absenoe of specimens from the fifth oould 
hardly be an aocident; and, as we shall seein this and sucoeeding 
ohapters, this was not an aooident, but evidence of the suo cess ot 
a definite Athenian pollcy.9 
8Lanoelot Lengyel, Chefs d'Oeuvre des Monnaies Orecgues (Montrouge, 1952), p. 9. - --- . 
9General souroes on the soientifio value of aoins and/or neg-
ative evidenoe in the field are: Peroy Gardner, The !I2!! of Greek 
Coins (CambrIdge, 1883), pp. 56-711 Stanley Lane=P'OoIe;-co!iis and . 
Medals, Jrd revised egition (London, 1894), p. 12; Kurt £udwig---
RegIlDS, Die Antike Mfinze ala Kunstwark (Berl'n, .924). p. 47; 
Oskar Vle~antt, An£Iki diWIontsnormen und Munzfusse {Berlin, 1923 
pp. 34-41. -.
We should also note at thIs pOint that many of the ohief 
souroes whioh we shall employ in establishing our numismatic his-
tory were published upwards of forty years ago. Headts Ristoria 
Numorum, perhaps our most valuable single source, was p~E1isned 
in 1911, the various catalogues ot the British Museum, written by 
Head. Hill, Poole, and Wroth, were issued between 1877 and 1897; 
Gardner's A Ristorf of Anoient cOlnif8 was published 1n 1918. 
. Relying heavi y-on such books ght seem to date our treat-
ment; but this is not entirely true", The other souroes that we 
shall cite almost as frequently, such as Robinson (1949) and 
Seltman, Greek Coins (1955), 1n many 1nstanoes treat much the same 
matter as the older texts, though perhaps not extending their con-
sidera tions over as large an area. It is only tail' to remark that 
these more recent studies, which are in general more specialized, 
do not contradiot the older accounts (save in a very tew cases, 
none of whiehatfect the Athenian Empire, e.g., as regards Athens 
from 594 to 561), but merely till in more precise details in the 
outlines of the older authors. The "dated" books still remain 
authorities in their field and will oontinue to do so until some 
one oombines their evidence with the more specialized recent 
work into a new definitive volume. Such a project, however, is 
not in Sight. 
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Not all of our evidenoe, however, is negative. There will 
be a oertain amount which will oonsist in either the change ~rom 
the looal to the Athenian standard of ourrenoy or the adoption 
of Athen1an~vices on the ooins. The l~oal standards were usually 
fixed by theit- relative convenience as an exohange rate for a 
g1ven 01 tYJ they would depend largely on t he standards of the 
other states with whom the home oity was most likely to do busi-
ness. A shift in suoh a standard would indioate a corresponding 
shift in the commercial life of the city brought about by some 
exterior press of oiroumstanoes. IO The seoond oommon type of 
positive evidence, the adoption of Athenian emblems on a c1ty t s 
coinage, would be a much more definite indioation of the plight 
of a state. The city states were proud of their native blazons; 
and to surrender or to effaoe them in any way would hardly be oon-
sistent with the ordinary mode of aotion of a free city.11 
But now let us return to our narrative. After the Pelopon-
nesians had retired from Byzantium and the Athenians had gained 
their rirst, slim hold on their allies, the Delian confederacy 
or a nmuber of years pursued its martial aims.12 Thuoydides is 
sparing 1n his information on the early aotivities of the oo~ 
l~hese oircumstanoes need not neoessarily be hostile in 
character. 
110n the relation between ooinage and state sov9reignty, Qon-) 
G. F. Hill, A Handbook of Greek and Roman Coins {London, 1~99 , 
82-85. - , - . -
after yielding to Athenian dominatio 
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federacy. He was not concerned with most of its actions against 
the Persians in Asia tanor, since those would not oontribute to 
his tale of the formation of the Athenian Empire. Instead he 
mentions only those campaigns which have a direct bearing on his 
story--i.e., those which took place in the ehiefly Greek terri-
tories immediately surrounding the Aegean. Hence he confines his 
remarks on the operations of the Dolian league during the first 
seven years of its existence to the following: 
First, then, under the leadership of Cimon son 
of Mlltiades, they took by siege Eion on the Strymon, 
which the Persians held, and enslaved its inhabitants; 
then they enslaved Soyros, the island in the Aegean 
inhabited by Dolopians and colonized it themselves. 
And a war arose between them and the Carystians, the 
other Euboeans taking no part ~n it, and after a time 
terms of capitulation were agreed upon.13 
These three seemingly insigniticant listings in themselves 
tell us a good deal about the gradually shifting charaoter of the 
confederaoy. Eion on the Strymon river was a seaport in Thrace 
about two hundred a.nd twenty-f'ive miles west ot the Hellespont. 
In the year 476 it was the most important holding in the Thracian 
region still in the hands ot the Persians. Its strategic value 
lay in the taot that it controlled the valley of the Strymon 
leading northward into the hill oountry and that it was a con-
venient sea base near the rich gold mines on the northern main-
land near Thasos. Attacked in the late summer of 476, Bog~s, its 
Persian oommander, held out under siege throufAout the winter, 
13 a I. 9 , 1-3. 
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but was eventually made to capitulate. Thus Eion passed into the 
hands of the confedoracy, who enslaved its inhabitants. The 
fallen condition of the oity is refleoted in the remark of the 
British scholar Percy Gardner, who in hls Historl 2! Ancient 
qoinage remarks: "It is noteworthy that we have no coin that we 
can with confidence give to Elon on the Strymon in the middle of 
the firth century. u14 
The capture of Scyros, the second event mentioned by Thucy-
dides in the early activities of the oonfeder-aoy, took place about 
474. Scyros, a rocky ls1L~d ln the Aegean between Attica and 
western Thrace (and so on the sea route to the Hellespont), was 
the stronghold of the Dolopian pirates, who preyed en passing 
shipping. The island fell to the forces of the confederacy, and 
its inhabitants too were enslaved. Besides this enslavement, the 
island was annexed to Athens; and Athenian colonists were sent 
to settle the land. 
The capture of Scyros was the first recorded instanoe of 
Athens receiving direct profit trom an adventure of the confed-
eracy Which the other members of the group did not share. Robinson 
also notes that the previous coinage of the island ceases abrupt. 
ly around It 70, a reasonable SUbstantiation of Thucydides t account, 
all things oonsidered.15 
14aardner, Hlatoty. 274. Cf. also Head, ~., 197. 
lSE. Robinson, "The Athenian Currency Decree and the Coinages 
of the Allies,n Hesperia, Supplement VIII (1949), 333. 
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The third event was the war with the Carystians, which lasted 
pl"obably from 475 or 414 till Lt 71. Carystia, the southern part 
of the island ot Euboea, was inhabited by a raoial group different 
from the rest of the island; and thus its inhabitants were not 
helped by their fellow Eubo6ens against Athens. The Carystians 
had orieinally refused to join the confederacy at Delos, but 
now they were ooerced into doll1S so. Athens felt that it \Vas dan-
gerous to have a neutral state so near to Attioa. Carystus, the 
city, was weak and unable to oarry on an extended war with the 
Athenians. It capitulated and thus became the first state forced 
to join the oonfederacy against its will. l6 
These three events nmrked a definite progress in the power 
of Athena. At first she worked with the confederacy tor its ad-
vantage, then tor her advantage; and finally she began to use the 
confederacy almost as her personal tool, when sbe sought to swell 
its ranks with people whose absence would be a distinct 'fiisadvan-
tage for her. The next ocourrenoe noted by Thuoydides brings 
out this transition more sharply: membership in the confederacy 
no longer remained a question of option, even for the original 
r.lembers. The once completely autonomous Greeks now found them ... 
selves as much under the thumb of Athens as the hapless Carystians. 
... 
16carystia in 471 entered the league as a subjeot, yet still 
retained certain vestiges of freedom. It did not change its 
coinage at this time, but only after further diffioulties and its 
second capture. Secondat~y sources on Eion, Scyros, and Carystla 
are: Bury, 336-338; Q. !::.. 11., V, 50-53; Cavaignao, Etude,S, h6. 
Thuoydldes m!ll"ks this milestone in the following words: 
Atter this they waged war upon the Naxians, who had re-
volted, and reduoed them by siege. And this was the 
first allied oity to be enslaved in violation of the 
established rule; but afterwards the others also were 
enslaved as it happened in eaoh oa8e.17 
Some thirty years earlier, Naxos had been the wealthiest and most 
powerful of the Cyolades. But now, when it attempted to secede 
from the league about 470,18 it was easily blookaded by the allied 
fleet and reduoed to submission. Thuoydldes gives no reasons 
why Naxos should have wanted to secede, but it seems fairly ob-
vious that there must have been some dissatisfaotion at this time 
among the members of the confederacy with the burdens being i~ 
posed by Athens. 
Nor on the side of Athens was there wanting an e )touse. Just 
as "politioal necessity" had been alleged for taking over Carystus 
so too, in the oase of Nazoa, Athens as administrator of the 
confederacy was simply maintaining her right of foroing ~he in~ 
dividual mambaI's to fulfill -cheir obligations until the associa .... 
tion should be dissolved by the common oonsent of all. The ac-
tion in itself may have seemed relatively simply done and perhaps 
even oalled for by the oocasian, at least in the minds of the 
Athenians. But its real signifioance lay in the faot that by it 
a preoedent was established and the terms of the original allianoe 
definitely determined--the allies had not the right to seoede. 
171, 98, 4. 
l~e date may aotually have been anywhere from 470 to 467. 
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"And this was ~le first allied city to be enslaved in viola-
tion of' the established rule; but afterwards the others also wel"e 
enslaved as it happened in each 08s •• ,,19 When Thuoydides speaks 
of enslavement here, he uses the word. tOou).weTj. In other words. 
N~~os was praotioally reduced to the status of a subjeot of' Athens1 
a grirl punishment for seee ssion to warn any other states who 
might be inolined to atten~t some similar oourse of aotion. This 
subservient state of the island is attested to by its oOinage, 
whioh oeased ab~uptly around the year 410--a sign ot non-existent 
autonol'l1y.20 
Atter the desoription of the revolt of Naxos, Thuoydides 
once r.~re interrupts the thread of his narrative by inserting a 
brief paragl'"aph on the prinoipal oauses foI' revolts fttol1l the 
league. In general, he says th.at these were "failures in bring-
ing in the tribute Ott their quota of ships and, in some oases, 
ttefusal of military servioe. tt21 Athens was exacting in her duties 
as tribute collector; and .. YJhen states did not oomply with her 
demands, she easily broU61'lt them into submission. 
We noted above that A thana at the inception of the league 
was not particularly stl~ong. How than was &"la able to put down 
19I, 98, 4. 
20secondar--l SOUl"ces on the ooinage of Uaxos are: Gardner, 
Historl. 244-243' Head, lIistoria Nwnorwu, 488; Robinson, 329. 
Other seoonda:ry souroes on "Naxos wIt! be Given after our subse-
quent treatment of Thnsos in this chapter. 
21I, 99. 1. 
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~evolts so readily? The reason for her increased strength was 
~hil!l. Many of the more short-s1gb.ted allies of the confederacy 
lad not been overly eager about sending their own citizens on the 
Persian campaigns; so they h.ad preferred to pay to obtain substi .... 
~utes for t'H3Mices, both in men and in ships. These substitutes 
ffhioh they supported financially became praotically a part of the 
l.thenian fleet; Athenians or Athonian r.10rcenaries manned the ves-
sels, and Athonian commanders took complete charge ot' them. Honee 
i,he Athenian navy waxed strong. While the islanders sat hO;:;le and 
paid to seal their own doom. 22 
After the revolt of Uaxos, Thucydides mentions briefly the 
battle at the river Eurymedon in pamphylia. 23 Here the conred-
era'eEl allies won deoisive victorles over the Persians both on 
la.'1d and sea and seoured thereby control of southern Asia :1inor 
f'rom Caria to Pamphylia.. Hence they were enabled to force Lydian 
co~nunities to enroll in the league. Alti~oud~ Thucydides refers 
~o the battle in paSSing, it is easy to glimpse its far-reaching 
effects among the cities of the region. The most strilcing exam-ple 
1s, of course, Ephesus, vHLlch exhibits a noteworthy series of 
coinage beginning from approximately the year 700 B.C. and con-
tinuing through almost a millennium. The only noticeable stop-
pae:e in the issues of this city occurred from the yeax's c. 469 
lUave 
221, 99, 1-3. Confer o.lso Cavaignac, Etudes, 1}2. 
231, 100, 1. The date of Eur~don ls,disputedJ it 
t~{en place anywhere between 4b9 and 407 
could 
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to 415 and m1?~t be taken as an index of Athenst ascendancy in the 
neighborhood--whlch began to wane arter the disaster in Sicily 
around 415.24-
A few years artsr the battle at Eurymedon and the consequent 
decline in the power ot the Great King over the Aor;ean coast, the 
island of Thasos near Thrace revolted. Tllucydides describes the 
events of the years 465-463 with terrirylng brevity: 
And some time af'te~ards it came to pass that the Tha-
sians revolted .from them, a quarrel havinG arisen about 
the trading posts and the rdne on the opposite coast of 
Tlkrace, of which the Tha.sians enjoyed the profits. 
Thereupon the Athenians sailed with their fleet again.st 
Thasos, B....'1d, a.fter winning a battle at sea, disembarked 
on the island. 2!;) 
• • • and so the '.I'ha.lans, who were in the third year 
of their siege, came to terms with the Athenians, pul-
ling down their walls and dellve~ing over their ships, 
agreein;:; to pay forthwith whatever sum of money should 
be required of them and to render tribute in future, 26 
and finally. givinG up both the mainla.nd and the mine. ' 
Thasos, the strol1f~est state in the whole northern region. around 
Thra.cc, was much more powerful tha...'1 Naxos at the time of its 
rebellion. It had not been one of those states that had preferred 
to pay for substitutes, but had continued to maintain its own 
24souroes on the coina.ge of Ephesus and Lyoia, r.'l11c11 decros. 
somewhat in the volume of its output dll.r1ng the next; few years, 
are: Head, lIi~tor1a N'umorum, 573, 688.692; G. lP. Hill, c~taloFye 
.2! 2 err-esk coIns 0"1 L:reia;, I!agPhl11a, .!!l£! Pis1dla (London, 1(17) 
L"t-L"t1. 
25I , 100, 2. 
2<jI, 101. J. 
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large fleet up until this time. Consequently, it was better able 
to resist the siege of Athens and mi[;ht even have had sone Sllcoess 
in its defianoe of the imperial oi ty, but the unforttrrlate ooour-
l~ence of the earthqual:a at Sparta and the subsequent revolt of 
the Helots prevented them from l"eooi vine; tho pron~tsod aid fron. 
that quarter. Thus in the winter of 46)/2 they capitulated, 
surrenderinG their fleet, pLulin0 down their fortifications, and 
~iving up their posts on tho mainland as well as their ri~~ts to 
work the rich gold mines of Mount Pa~~aeus. 
These mines had previously provided the ohief source of X'e. 
venue for the Thasians, and their loss profoundly affected the 
city. Though Athans did not impose a ban on their COinage, still 
their once opulent flow of satyr and dolphin money pieces slowed 
down to a trickle after 463. Also, vmereas they had formerly 
m~intGd on the Babylonian standard, now they gradually chang$d 
their issues to the Attic standard; tho weight of theirarac~~s 
steadily deoreased until they reaohed the level of Athenian coins 
and, in some instanoes, even dropped below it. 27 
Even more interesting to observe was what the Athenians did 
with their newly acquired Gold. Athenian cur~ency had ubJays been 
issued on a strict silver standard; and it would have Greatly com ... 
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'Dlicated. her trad.e relations to have be;?;un issu1ns on a gold one 
as well. Consequently, tho Athenians shipped the bars of sold 
i'l'tOl'll tlount Pangaeus to CYZ1Clls, a poor c1 ty in tho Hellespont, 
where eleotZ"Ul~ pieoes 1.fOre then minted. These ooins wore then em-
ployed in trade with the people o:f Asia 1i11nor who still used the 
Persia.."1 or Babylonian standard, one whioh was based pI'imnr1ly on 
cold. Without interfel'ting with her own domestic COE1nlCrCe, this 
pl"actice afforded Athens an outlet for her gold and offered her 
further eoonor.1io communication With the East. 
The fact that these eleotrum coins of GyziotlS,which began 
towards the middle of the :fifth centu.ry~ really belol'll;;ed to 
.<l.thenial1. interests is evidenced both by the previous indicence 
of the city and by the devioes placed on the pieoes. Such typical 
Attic dasi(~s as Har:aodius and Ar1stogai ton, Ge holdin:? young 
Er1chthonius" Cecrops, 8...'I1.d Triptolemus in his winged OaJ:~ appear 
among the great variety of types in the new electrUt71 coinage. The 
staters continued to appear down until the time of Alexander. 2D 
With. the conquering of bot:1 Nuos and 'Ihasos, the ohains of 
empire wore &,Tadually bein,'; forGed. By tIle year 1~60. t~lrOC classes 
oi.' members in the oonfederacy had become apparent: (1) tho non-
2DThe abundant e1eotrum coinage of Cyzicus rr~y be found 
treats'.! in: Gavaignac, Etudes, 184 ... 186; Von \Val ther Giesecke, 
A~~ikes ge,ldwesen (Leipzig, 1:938),68-751 Gardner, Hist~~, 231-
23J; G. F. UIli, A Guide to the De12artment of Goins anu. f.Iedals 
.~ the i3:':'itisfl 1fU3e~, "lrueU=-(!;ondon, !92m. 'PP. lr-It3; d. 1'. 
$01 E;1iL~, r.lastetplaces .2! G::;;-eek CoinaGe, (Oxford, 191./-9), p. 211 
John Ward, Greek CoIns !!.!2 Their Pa.ren,~ Oities (London. 1902), 
PP. 97-99. 
35 
tributary allies who furnished ships, c .. g.,. Ghlos, Lashos, Samos; 
(2) tributary allies wh.o remained independent, 0.[,;., Abdera, 
Aenos, S1nopeJ (3) tributary allies who were dependent, e. C;. J 
}Taxos, Thasos, Carystus. All cities coerced to join and all 
cities that had revolted and were subsequently subdued belonz,ed 
to this third class, in which Athens wished eventually to include 
everyone. 
About this time, also, nrobably in !~6l, perioles, the man 
chiefly responsible .for the final state of the Athenian Empire, 
ca.me to power. ThouGh h1s name is not mentioned explicitly in 
co~~ection with the actions ot the next decade or so,. still it 
is reasonably certain that he was the guiding light behind most 
of' the ~"1onders wrOUGht by Athens, which by the middle of the cen-
tUl"'y had secured her supremacy over the Aegean world. 
After the revolt of Thasos, the next event mentioned by 
Thucydides in connection with th~ rise of the Athenian t~1re is 
the war with Asgin&.. Aegina, a sma.ll island just south of Athens, 
had been one of the foremost merchant powers in Greece for the 
two centuries prlor to tho Parsia..."'l wars. She had been t?1El first 
state in Europe to issue coinage; and her tortoise-back coins 
VJare known allover the civilized world. Her Aeginetan. standard 
had l:)ecome so firmly established in the Peloponnese, as well u.s 
in other reGions, that even Athens was forced to pay all Pelopon-
nesia.n mercenaries in this distasteful foreign standard. Ae:;:;ina 
had feared the sudden rise of the Athenian power in the Aegean 
because her trade l"C)utes wIth. the East and tho r:roater part of 
her COl:tmerCe lay in tha'::; area. The 8i tuation becarl10 desperate 
when Athens completed negotiations with Megara for the 
use of the port lliso.ea. Ji.e:~;ina was the first to realize that this 
would [:,iva the Athenians almost complete control over the Saronic 
Cult. 
Other Peloponnesian states also fea.red the Athenian menaoe 
which \7808 movinr~ in in their near vioinity. They joined with 
!.Ikeglna into a large ooalition f'leet, whlch Athens defeated near 
Aeglna in tho sU!Zl.t'1ler of' 458. A thana then followed up her advan-
tar;;a b:r investing the lh"lf'ortunate island both. by land and sea. 
f\fter a siege of two years, Aec:lna fell, agreed to surrender her 
fleet, a.nd to pay tribute to Athens. This was a welcome suecess 
for the Athenial'ls both strategically and e011llnercially. Along 
wi til Thusoa, Aegina was a.mont~ the 1:10St opulent of the subject 
3tates; they were both assessed th.irty talents per year,· much 
;"!10re than the other cities. 
The decline of AeZlna after 456 is likewise reEleoted in the 
±rop in her output of coinage. As befitted a. prosnerous mercl1ant 
city, she had, prior to Ii-56, issued drachms and tetradrachms on 
a 2;rand ocale and. had. even been oxperlmentinr 1".tL th a new reverse 
typo to replace her wcll-lolown 1ncuse just before ~er demise. 
But now, she ceased to mint the larger denominat;1ons, though she 
::!ontinuoc1 to ~llll-;; a small supply of triobols j"'or local use. 
81nce her standaI>d a.f'ter such a great vogue of mora tha.."l two cen .... 
37 
turie. could hardly be ehan.l~ed, she was a.llowed to preserve It.29 
i~bI1. the s lege ot" Aefl,lna was still In propress in 457, the 
Spartans had sent an army north into Boeotian terrItory, osten-
sibly to help their fellow Dorian oities who v/ere being oppressed 
by Phocla. The real purpose, however, had been to join forcos 
wi th the Boootlana and than to make a combined attaC!k on the Athe-
nia.ns.. This coalition foroe won a viotory over a larf:c Athenian 
a.rmy at Tanagrl.1, r..ot far fl"om tho boroer of Boeotia and Attica. 
f·~ut the battle was not deoisive, and the Spartans withdraw soon 
afterwards to their hOMola.nd. 
About two months after tr~ departure of the Spartan troops, 
the Athenia.ns avenged themselves. Marohing onco aGain into 
Boeotian terri tory, they eas lly overcame the looal foroes at 
Oenophyta, thus gaining control over the whole land except for 
Thebes. The newly aoquired oities were not foroed to joIn the 
confederacy, but only to furnIsh soldiers men demanded: (The 
reason for this 1 $Ilieney is that A ~'1.enB t hold over them was pro-
bably slim} and she wished, If POBS ibIe, to avoid en~enderlng an 
immediate revolt.) The Athenians, howew.)r, did ut:tlizo t,:"ls op-
portunity to set up demooratic rove~nment8 in many 01ties.30 
29souroOB for the coinago of Aogina are: C. S. Comparottl A Dasorl11t1v! Catalop;ue of Greek CoIns nl~nf Yorit, 1921), pp. 54-
55; Gardner, History, 241: !lead, JUstorla, 395-3C}7; Pobins,:m, 336. 
-30lt was the our1"ent holter in polltios that democratIc i~OV-
ernments even among tradl tlon.:'llly hos tile peopll3s would be fa vor-
able to a democratic Rovernment at home. !lhe fallacy or thia 
statement was proved over and over again to the li.theni:ms duril1"t'r. 
the course of the next fOl .. ty J'ours. 
'1'hi s temporary eclipse of Boeotian power is 80me\"OO t re-
flected in their coinage. Oligarchic governments at Tanagra and 
Orchomenus had been minting actively since about 1j.7R; but their 
issues cease in 457. And, under the Athenian aegis, four small 
democratic governroent8--Acraeph~um, Coroneia, Haliartus, and 
Tanagra--celebrated their autonomy by issuing coin. These new 
issues continued just for the short period of Attic supremacy in 
the area.3l 
The rising star of Athenian imperialism, as far as we know, 
was marred by only one setback during this era. This was the 
ill-fated Athenian expedition to Egypt. In 460, about two hundred 
ships of the league had gone to the land of the Nile to aid the 
Libyan Inarus, who was attempting to revolt from the pro-Persian 
administration. This large force had fought with varying suc-
cess for about six years; but :fInally the enemy had trapped the 
Athenian forces and well nigh annihilated them in 454. 'Thucy-
dides devotes a long section of his wrk to the telling of this 
grandiose enterprise; but it has only indirect bearing on the 
rise of the Athenian Empire, as we shall presently see. 
In the year 454, after the news of the disaster in Egypt had 
31The coins of Boeotia are treated in detail in Head's Coin. 
2! Boeotia (Oxford, 1881). The effects of the current battles are 
mentioned on pages 196 through 200. 
Thucydides treats the campaigns of Aegina and Boeotia in 
!~ 105-108. Secondary sources on this historl are: Bury, 355-
3/7; ~. !. R., V. 76.83; Cavaignac, Etudes, 56. 
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reached Athens, Pericles made the bold stroke which left no doubt 
as to the status of the Pelian confederacy. He removed the trea-
sury from its former headquarters on the island of Delos and in-
stalled it on the Acropolis in Athens. All pretense was at an 
end. The league had now openly become the Empire of the Athenians 
It is strange that Thucydides makes no mention of this im-
portant move. We know of it only throu,gh ]a ter historians. es-
pecially Plutarch,32 and from the quota lists which now begin to 
appear regularly. These lists, ¥bieh were kept as treasury re-
cords to show the payment of the annual d,1ta.px1}, begin in the year 
454/3 • .33 
Commentators on Thucydides have regarded this omission as 
somewhat of a mystery beoause, as is generally agreed, the trans-
fer of the treasury was perhaps the most important single event 
in the transi tiOll from confederacy to empire. tfuis was the de-
cisive ooint in the relationship between Athens and her'allies, 
and Athens could from now on do pretty much as she liked with the 
~roup. Various reasons for the omission have been offered. 
Thilcydides pays lIttle attention to the levying of tribute and 
other economic aspeots of war, though he does not ignore them 
completely. But this i8 not wholly satisfaotory, beoause he will 
on oocasion stop to relate almost insignifioant finanoial details, 
32P~rioles, XII, 1. 
33The cilt:a.pXT) was one-sixtieth of the rep,ular annual assess-
ment, paid to Athena for use of her precinct as treasury. 
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~8 we shall see later. J4 Others suggest that the event was too 
~ell known, and that Thucydides did not wish merely to repeat 
earlier ehroniolers and rehash the obvious. But there seems to 
~e little foundation tor this eontention, sinoe the historian 
~oes not hesitate to relate such well-worn themes as the woes ot 
the Sioilian Expedition, the siege ot Plataea, and so forth. 
~enee some maintain that Thucydides left the transfer ot the 
treasury out at his acoount because it would not fit into the 
scheme ot his attempted justifieation or the Empire. Yet this 
too does not seem likely, sinoe the rising power of Persian 
Egypt and the conseq,uent pl"estige offered the Phoenieian fleet 
in the Aegean would have affopded the Athenians ample alibi for 
the removal. And Thuoydides has not hesitated to tell us of 
events, e.g., the Malian aftair, where the Athenian exouse was 
~uoh less plausible. We will retu~ to this problem again in a 
~uture chapter. 35 
By way of summary. then, of thls period trom 418 to 454, let 
IUs make the followlng obseI'Vatlons. After our initlal remarks 
on the origin ot the Delianleague, whioh oould hardly be SUbstan-
tiated t tt'om numismatics, we were able for the most part to trace 
~ certain parallelism between Thucydldes' narratlve and the evi-
34conter Appendix I. 
35Th• subjeot ot the removal ot the treasury 1s discussed 
in: Bury, 339-340, Q. !_ g_, V, 84-85. Cavai~~ao, Etudes, 59-62. 
Gamme, I, 370-372. 
dence from coinage. With the exceptions of Eion, which had not 
issued cOinage previous to her aapture, and Carystus, whiah re-
mained somewhat independent under the aonfederacy until 446, the 
other major exploits of Athens lett their mark on contemporary 
coinas~. Sayros, Naxos, Ephesus, Tanagra, Orchomenus, all stopped 
minting when they tell under Athenian domination. The onoe weal-
thy states of Thasos and Aegina were foroed to curtail their out-
put of aoins drastically, and Thasos even switched from the Baby-
lonian to the Attic standard. At the same time, Cysious profited 
by the new Athenian management of the Thasian gold mines and be-
gan to issue her prolific staters with the pro-Athenian blazons. 
And even tiny Delos, under Athenian administration, issued no 
ooins after the inoeption of the league in 478/7. Finally, the 
great stone tablets from the Aoropolis and passages 1n later 
historians tell us of the removal of the treasury from its ori-
ginal site at Delos, tilling in Ii lacuna 1n Thuoyd1des t narrative. 
Thus we tind consIderable help In substantiating the Thuoyd1dean 
aocount ot the years 478-454 through ooinage and even, 1n the par-
t10ular 1nstanoes ot Ephesus and the transter ot the treasury, 
adding to it. 
CHAPT~1"\ III 
THE HISTORY OF THE A11ffiI!NIAN EMPIRE: 454-432 B.C • 
• ~~ao~a~oxWA~~ £l~, xa~ vO~OU~ veou' 
Tjxw '1'{a.p~U!J.a:<; OeGpo 1tWAT)OWV. 11,. ~O -r:{; 
xp~Oeaa Ne~eAoxoXXUy,a~ ~OroOe -r:Or~ !J.e-r:p010l 
o'ta81J..OL <1 L Xa.l ~T)<p' <1\-LU<'" Xa.ed.'1'{e;p bAOq)\J~, 0 L • 
--Aristophanes, Aves, 1037-1041. 
In 451, the Peloponnesians and the Athenians agreed to ob-
serve a five-year truce. This left Athens free to settle the 
Persian question once and for all. Amassing the collective 
strength of her empire, she conducted a number of campai~ns in 
Egypt and Cyprus. Eventually, in 449, her forces won memorable 
victories both on land and sea near Salamis in Cyprus. The Per-
sians sued for a permanent peace, which the Athenians joyfully 
concluded, pro~ably in the same year. l 
Once peace with the Persians had become a reality, there 
was no lonr;er the slightest pretext for allowing the old Delian 
confederacy to continue; its original express purpose had been 
accomplished. Athena, however, instead of relinquishing her 
hold on the members of the old league, tightened her grip on the 
foreign states by issuing in the year 449 what was known as the 
lSources on the treaties of 451 and 449 are: Thuoydldes, I, 
112, 1-4; Bury, 359-360; ~. !. li., v, 87. 
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Decree of Clearchus. 2 
This new decree protected the I-\. thenian monopoly 01' trade by 
forbidding: (1) the strikinf~ of silvaI' coins in any of the cities 
of" what was now her empire; (2) the use of any currencYJI we5_ghts, 
and measures other than Athenian. Deapi te the recent d afaa t of 
Aegina, there was still a mass of Aeglnet~l money in circulation, 
which provided a constant and irritating reminder to Athens of 
that city's all-too-recent greatness; and this was probably a 
major factor in the promulgation of the law. 3 By the very .fact 
that such a stern proclamation could be enforced and that states 
could be forbidden, as Seltman puts it, to "fly their national 
flag by stamping their state device upon coinage,,,4 proves that 
Athens at this time possessed true imperial power and that auto-
2We do net possess a complete text of the Decroe of Cloarchw 
A partial resoration may be found in Robinson, 327. 
The contents and date of the decree may be lnferred< hoth 
f~om the incomplete text and from a later decree, published to 
rel:lforce the requirements of the former. ffuis second decree. 
probably published 8ornath:"e between 423 and 420, likewise spoke 
of the desired uniformity among, the states of the Empire in the 
matter of money, weiGhts, and measures. A complete text; of this 
latter decree may be found in: Karl Friedrich WiL~e1m Dittenberger 
.§L~!:.9~f! InscriE,tionum Grn.oc~.~um (4 vols.; Leipz5.g, 191.5-1924>, I, 
111-124; Marcus N. Tod" A Selection of Greek Historical Inscrip-
Jt!9..M (Oxford, 1933), 7f61',-pp. 163-105'. 
JRob ins on, 325. 
4This quotation 1s an adaptation of a statement of Selcman 
in his Greek Coin" 2nd ad. (London, 1955), p. 112. 
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nomy for many states had ceased to exist. 
Thus we might say that the effects of this decree serve to 
show the extent of Athens' power at this time. Among the states 
of the Aegean world which ceased issuing coinage around the year 
450 for no apparent reason other than this decree, we find the 
following: 
Abydus 
Aenos 
Antandros 
Asaos 
Camlrus 
Carthaea 
Cebren 
Chalcedon 
Chersonesus (Hellespont) 
Clazomenae 
Cnldus 
Colophon 
Cyme 
Dardanus 
Dlkaea (Eretrla) 
Halicarnassus 
Ialysus 
Lampsacus 
Lindus 
Mende 
Paros 
Phasells 
Potldaea 
Scapsa 
Scepsis 
Sclone 
Selymbria 
Slphnos 
Stag ira5 Terone. 
It is certainly more than c oine idence that all these e:1. ties should 
stop minting within about a year of one another; and it provides 
ample substantiation of the success of the Decree of Clearehus. 
These,however, are just the states which Intermitted their 
coinage for the first time aeter the decree. tl'l.'1ere were a number 
of other states wrrich had also previously issued coins, but seem 
to have stopped even before 449: 
Aeglna 
Andros 
Astypalaea 
,----_._-----
Calymna 
Carpathus 
Caryatus 
Chaleis 
Chersonesus 
(Carla) 
5The data contained in this list may all be verified by the 
tables in Robinson. Some of It can likewise be gotten from Head, 
Hratoria Numorum, and Gardner, History. For a detailed substan-
tiation with regard to the coinage of Aenos, confer J. M. F. May, 
~f.noa, Its lUstorz !.!!S.£2.~~ (Oxford, 1950); this work con-
tains many fine tables for that state and its colna~e durin,r: the 
whole of the fifth century. 
Cor,sia 
Coso 
Delos 
Dikaea (Abdera) 
Ephesus 
Eretria 
Erythrae 
Iasus 
Iuli. 
Methymna 
Naxos 
Olynthus (Chalcidice) 
Parium 
Peparethos 
Smothrace 
Scithae 
Scyros 
Seriphus 
Sermylia 
Tenedos 
Tenos 
Termera 
Thasos 
Thera 
1I inde.'7 
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'!'hese two lists, taken together, give us a fine indication of the-
effectiveness of Athenian domination. 8 
Once again. we rous t remark the stra.nge. ilence of Thucydides 
on this matter. He makes no mention whatsoever of what was per-
haps the first official act of tyrwlny on the part of the Athe-
nians; and such an explicit show of imperial power could hardly 
have escaped his notice. Why did he leave out tho decree? There 
are at least two possible reasons that we might adduce. Of the 
thirty-three names given in the second list, we might infer only 
seven from the previous Thucydidean text--Aegina, Carystus, Delos, 
Ephesus, Naxos, Scyros, and Thasos. when and how the downfall of 
the other twenty-six states came about Is left to our imagination; 
6From 449 on, Cos was permitted to issue only a few commemo-
rative coins (no national currency) in honor of her festival of 
Apollo. (Head, Historia Humorum, 632.) 
7Th1s list may also be substantiated in 1"I;s entirety from 
the tables in Robinson and the other sources mentioned in note 5 
on the precedinG page. I have omitted Tanagra and Orchomenus 
from this lift because they resumed coinage (i.e., oligarchical 
coinage through Thebes) shortly after the deoree 'L1ent into effect. 
8Some cities8uch as Cnldus, even thoue;h their regular 
series had ceased in 449. were allowed to mint small denominations' 
on the Attic standard. Confer the tables in Robinson. 
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Thucydides probably did not deem their dGmise worthy of note. 
And, in a similar mariller, he may not have thought that the sup-
press ion of many 01' the cities in the :eirs t list was worth men-
tioning and hence omitted all reference to the decree, as he had 
omitted the trans'fer of the treasury some five years earlier--a 
much more important event. A second possible reason why Thucy-
dides neglected the decree may be that its conditions were not 
universally en'forceable. Regions at some dis tance from Athens 
and thus not so rigidly under her domination either continued 
to mint as before, e.g., tycia,9 or eventually had to be given 
concessions so as to stave off revolt, e.g., the Thracian region 
after 439. 10 
Athens was now a t the height of her power in the fifth cen-
tury. She had control over most of the cities in the AeGean area, 
with large holdings in Euboea, Thrace, the Euxine, the Hellespont, 
Ionia, Caria, Lycia, and the Cyclades, with a few outposts in the 
Peloponnese (e.g., Troezen) and in Western Greece (e.g., Naupac-
tUB) • She was al so in allianee wi th Megara and was operating the. t 
city's port at Hisaea. She ruled Aegina and had nothing to fear 
from her conquered northern nei&~bors in Boeotia. Furthermore, 
because of her five-year truce with Sparta and her allies, she 
4:)0. 
9The silver coinage of Lycia was evidently back to normal by 
lOWe will return to th:ts subject later on in the chapter. 
Secondary sources on the Decree of Clearchus include: Bury, 
366; Seltman. Greek Coins, III and 155, note; Weil, 356. 
was for the moment free to consolidate her holdings. In this 
undertaking, however, she would not be altogether succesaful. 
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In 448 a small ser'ies of hos till ties took place, which have 
usually been dignified by historians by the term, the "Sacred 
War. tI The Spartans marched north across the Isthmus of Corinth 
to expel the Phocians from Delphi and to make the international 
oracle autonomous. When they departed, thej<~ left the Delphians 
in possession of the shrine. The Athenians meanwhile, careful 
not to violate the truce, waited until the Spartans had left and 
then went and reinstated the Phocians. Beg1Iming in this period, 
that is, f'rom 448 to 421, the previous series of coina~e from 
Delphi, featuring the head of the eponymous Delphos, is .inter-
rupted--lendlng credibility to 'I'hucydides' account of Athenian as-
cendancy over both Phoclans and Delphians. ll 
The following year, 447, the Thebans incited a rebellion 
in the extreme northwest of Boeotia. The Athenians at first 
did not thInk that the uprising would prove to be serious and 
sent out a token force of one thousand men to quell the disturb. 
ance. TheIr army was ba.dly beaten at Coronea, and n:tany of the 
A thenlans were taken prisoner. Holding these men as hostages, 
the Boeotians then forced the Athenians to evacuate their whole 
territory to regain ~leir captured troops. After these severe 
losses, Loerls and ot'ler 01 ties renounced their alliance with 
Athens; nnd, with a single unfortunate incident, the entlre em-
IlThuc:vdidesa IJL 112. 5. Head. Hiatoria Numor'WIL. 1L'_O-1hl 
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pire of Athens to its immediate north collapsed. 12 
Once the authority of the Athenians over Boeotia had ceased, 
so did the many independent governments which had been issuing 
coinage since 457. Thebes regained her suzerainty over the land; 
and, ufter 446, hers are the only Boeotian coins seen for some 
time. 13 
The next year, 446, the year in which the treaty with the 
Peloponnes ians was due to expire, the A t!lenians suffered more 
reverses of fortune. Thuoydides tells of the events of. this 
year quite succinctly: 
Not long after this Euboea revolted from Athens; 
and Pericles had just crossed over to the island with 
an Athenian army when word was brought to him the. t 
Megara had revolted, that the Peloponnesians were 
about to invade Attica, and that all the Athenian 
garrison had been destroyed by the Megarians except 
such as had escaped to Nisaea. The Megarians had 
effected this revolt by bringing Corinthians, Sicyonians, 
and Epidaurians to their aid. So Pericles in haste 
brought his army back again from BUboea. After thi~ 
the Peloponnesians, under the comma.nd of Pleistoanax, 
son of Pausanlas, king of the Lacedaemonians, advanced 
into Attica as far as Eleusis and Thria, r~vaglng 
the country; but without going further, th,y returned 
home. Thereupon the Athenians again crossed over in-
to Euboea undE'~' the command of Pericles and subdued 
the whole of it; the rest of the island they settled 
by agreement, but expelled the Hestiaeans from their 
homes and themselves occupied the territory. 
WIthdrawing their troops from Euboea not long 
af'terwards they made a truce with the Lacedaemonlans 
and their allies which was to last for thirty years, 
12Thucydides, I, 113. 
13Head, Coins ~ Boeotia, 201.209. 
restoring Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Aehaea; for these 
were the places be1op.!,:,ing to the Pe1oponneslc:..ns whic:l 
the Athenians he1d. 14 
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The enemies of Athens had timed their actions well in 446. The 
Euboean revel t drew Peri cles and his men away from Athens. '!'hen, 
when PeJ:"lcles was informed of the massacre of the ,.1. thenian gar-
rison at Megara and of the Peloponnesians menacing Attica. he 
was forced to return to defend his home territory. l'he Spartans 
and their allIes were content with a few spoils from the Athenian 
homeland, as long as they succeeded in freeing the Megarld from 
imperial control; so they soon retired. Then Pericles was free 
to concentrate his attention on Euboea, which he quickly con-
quered and made the Whole island subject to him--just as Carystia 
on the southern tip had been reduced some twenty-five years 
earlier. The Hestiaeans were so harshly dealt with probably be-
cause their resistance was the most obstinate. They were driven 
from their homes, and their land was annexed to Athens. 
This downfall of Euboea to the status of subject state was 
reflected also in her namismatlc life. The right of coinage was 
withdrawn from all cities on the island in L~46, a.nd no more of 
their cuttlefish or nymph coins were seen until 411.15 
The events of this fateful year had taur~t the Athenians a 
lesson. They could not successt'ul.1y manage wars on two fronts 
14I, 114-115, 1. 
15I 114 H H 55 5 , • sad, Ist~p~a Numorum, 3 -3 7. 
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at one time; and they could not keep their empire in check and 
the Peloponnesians out or their territory. They had lost their 
1 hl tr 1 th "" id.l th ' 16 va UB. e con 0 over 0 ,. e,7a.r :In .. e process. Lest this 
same error be cont."ni tted ar;ain, the Athenians decided to take 
time off to consolidate the:ir holding; and, to this encl, t,hey 
concluded a rather expenslve treaty with the Peloponnesians, 
which was to last for thirty years. In the agreement, they were 
obliged to surrender Pegae and Nisaea, the two ports they had 
been using on the Megarid, Troezen, the only city in the Pelopon. 
Ilsse which used the Attic standard on their coinage and which 
put Athenian emblems on their money such as the helmeted Athena,l7 
and Achaea--in short, all the ir holdings in the Peloponnese. 18 
Thus. within the space of two brief years, Athens had lost 
slmost all her empire in her immediate vicinity on the Greek 
mainland: both Boeotia and Megara. Though she still retaIned 
:Ae~dna and, of course, Attica, she now began to take steps thqt 
this would not occur again and that all the places which she then 
held would never be able to stage such successful revol ts. 
16Since none of the coins of 1>1iegara were inscribed unt!l the 
first half of the fourth century, it is dif'ficul t to asce:r'tain 
whether or not the ten-year domination of Athens had any effect 
on her coinage. (Head, Historia Numorum, 393.) 
17The coins of Troezen are treated in Head, !.2.1:£., 4L~3. 
18 I • 114. Secondary sources on the history of the campai,gns 
~n Boeotia, Euboea. and Meg~r& are: Bury, 361-363; ~. !. ll., V, ~8-90J Cavaignac, Etudes, 56. Secondary sources on the peace of 
446 a~.: Bury, 362-363; £. ~. H., V, 90-92. Cf. also I, 115, 1. 
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Probably Athens exper:i.enced no more serious difficulties for 
the next six yea.rs a.t~d was able to weld her Empire into a. reason-
ably well-organized whole. F'or noi the I' nurn.ismat1.cA :n~r 'l'hucy-
didos tell us of any untoward event after the peace treaty of 
446 until the Samian War, wI11ch beGun :in h4o. 
The occasion of this war was a dispute wh:tch arose between 
Samos a.nd Mile tus about the possession of Priene, a town between 
them on the mainla.nd of' Ionia. In the wax' which resulted from 
their quarrel, Miletus was vanquished and, as a tributary ally. 
appealed to Athens against Samos, an independent ally. These 
cries of the Mll.esians were seconded by a group of private citI ... 
zens of' Samoa who disliked their current government and desired 
to set up a new ona. 
Athens decided the case In favor> of Milotus. ?er:tcleg 
sailed ,lith forty triremes to S9.m03 and overthrew the rctr;ning 
• 
aristocracy. He took :-lOstar:es fr·:J':?'\ among the overthro~m narty 
and establls:10d a. dOrlJcraey, leaving behind him an At l 18ntan ~ar-
rison for their protection. The exiled nobles, 1-1 owe ver , ~'!ho had 
fled to the :mainland, dId not take their defeat lir:htly. En11_st-
Ing the aupport of' the sa trap of Sardis" the:r hired so::ne mercen-
ar-ies and orossed over to Samoa by night. They to,;>}: the A the-
nians by 8uprise, imprisoned them along with the dair.oarats who 
fell into their hands, and also secretly removed their hostages 
from Lemnos where they were being detained. 
ferioles, however, was not entirely inactive. He and a 
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fleet of fifty-three sh:tps fought the Samian fleat off' the island 
of Traryia. and prevailed. He then blockaded Sa:.-nos by sea and in-
vested the city itself with three wa.lls, r,uarded by Athenian 
Ineantry. The Samians resisted for about eight months, but 
finally agreed to capltulate--pttlling down their walls, ,?;iving 
over hostages, surrendering their ships, and paying an indemnity! 
The democratic government was reinstated. 20 
Samos seems to have been the first city that attcr::rl;Jted re-
volt that was allowed after recapture to retain a measure of her 
old freedom. nlis was in all probability due to one or all of 
the following considerations: her nearness of blood to the Atha-
ntan pe opla, her large size, her previous record of loyalty, or 
the oocas ion for the revol t (since she had not premed1. tat;ed the 
defection, but merely had refused to accept an Athenian decision). 
Her rip.;hts wore someV'lhat curtailed; after the surrender, she was 
• 
made to abandon her former }::ilesian standard of coinage for' the 
Attie. Her new coins, much superior in. stylo to her prav':tous ones 
are so strikingly dIfferent from them that it is presumed that 
the dies were engraved by Athenian artists imported during a 
period of heavy Athenian influence. Later on, when an aristo-
19Dur.tng the Samian trouble of 440-439, Byzantium had also 
revolted. But, after the fall of Samos, she quickly came to terms 
with Athens, agreeing to be subject as before. This revolt of 
b.lzaIltl um is no ted by Thuc~7dl des in I, 115, .5 and 117, 3. 
20The revolt of Samos is treated in I, 115, 2 - 117; Bury, R 01 6 3".3-3;';1+1 £. !. !l., v, 1 9-171. 
cratic party friendly to the Athenians came to power about 428, 
the Athenians allowed them once more to mint on the ;ifileslan 
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standard; but an olive branch, similar to that found on Athenian 
coinage, regularly takes its place in the field, testifying to 
Samian loyalty to Athens. 2l 
After this revolt, some concessions on the subject of coinage 
seem to have been made, especially to the northern allies in the 
Thracian tribute region. Aphytis, Mende, Aenos, and Thasos 
resumed their interrupted coinage sometime shortly after 440. 
Perhaps this softening of imperial policy might hint at an effort 
being made to keep some of the allies who disliked Athenian finan-
cial policy and whose remoteness mtrAt afford Borne difficulty in 
supressing potential revolts. Such a sortening in policy 1s not 
revealed by Thucydidesj but this is hardly to be expected since 
~? he does not mention the inauguration of the policy in hh9.G:" 
• Arter this slight change in Thrace, Thucy-dides, in canclud-
2lThe coins of Samos are treated in Comparetti, 78; Gardner, 
Hi!tory, 248-250; Head, Historia Numorum, 602-603; Robinson, 330-
331. An interesting sidelight to the .. itch in minting standards 
at this time Is the corresponding change in other weights and 
measures. During the las t century, one of the ancien.t mea.sure-
ment standards from this period was round on Samos, with the 
Attic standards inscribed over the earlier Samian standards--a 
striking confirmation of both Thucydldes and coinage. F'or this 
find, confer A. MIchaelis, "The Metrological Relief at Oxrord,1I 
Th~ Jo~nal ~ Hellenic ~tudles, IV (1883), 335-350, but espeoi-
ally par:e340. 
22The Thracian concessions may be found treated in Q .• !. H., 
V, 171-176 and Robinson, 338. 
I 
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1ng h1s account of the remaining seven years of the Pentecontetia, 
439-432, tou~~es briefly on the two events that immediately pre-
ceded the Peloponneslan War: the Corcyrean affair and the battles 
at Potidaea, which later came to be interpreted as an Athenian 
violation of the truce of 446.23 Corcyra had a.ays remained 
an independent ally of Athens; hence no change is observed in 
hal' coinage. Potldaea was Included a.monr: those allies of the 
Athenia.ns who ceased minting in 449 after the Decree of Clearchus; 
and she did not, of course, mint during her brief period of 
revolt. 24 
After these events, Sparta summoned an assembly of her allies 
who had grievanoes against Athens with regard to the violation of 
the th!rty-years peace. During the meetings of this assembly, 
various speeches were given, including the defense s peoch of the 
Athenian already mentioned in chapter one and a speech by the 
• 
aged Spartan king Archldamus, who counselled postponing hostili-
ties against 80 strong a power as Athens. Eventually this first 
aS8embly of the Lacedaemonians and their allies decided that the 
treaty had been broken25 and that the Athenians were in the wrong. 
2JTh.e brief mention of Potidaea and Corcyra is made :tn I, 
IlS, 1 at the end of 11'hucydidas' account of the Pentecontetia. 
He had treated them at length in I, 56-67 and I, 24-55 earlier. 
24For the coins of Corcyra., confer, Historia NmnortL.'!!, 325-
326; for those of Pot1daea, confer Robinson 333 ft. 
25I, 87-88. 'I II 
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The meeting adjourned, and the Spartans sent envoys to 
Delphi to asce~tain the advisabIlity of going to war. After re-
oeiving a favorable reply from the god,26 they convened another 
assembly of their allies to find out whether all their Pelopon-
neslan contederates wanted to go to war with tnem. 27 Atter sun-
dry speeohes, the majority voted tor war; and preparations tor 
their first oftensive to be undertaken in the following year were 
begun. 28 
By way of summary, then, for the early 1e~s ot the Empire 
from 454 to 432, let us make the following observations. Three 
events disoussed 1n this chapter, namely the truce of 451 with 
the Spartans, the treaty ot 449 with the Persians, and the as-
semblies at Sparta in 432, oan ot their very nature reoelve no 
substantIation trom numismatios.29 The treaty ot 446 With the 
Peloponnesians receive. at best an indirect confirmation ot one ot 
its oonditlons--namely that Troezen was a town associatea with 
Athens, as seen from its related standard and emblem., faots un-
paralleled elsewhere in the Peloponnese. We do not, however, 
know enough about Troezen's tifth-century coins to be able to say 
that they ceased to be struck in this manner atter the oity came 
261, 118, 3. 
271, 125, 1. 
2~he as&embl..les at sp.arta are descr1bed 1n It 67-89 and 118-
125J Bury, 394-390' £. !. !i., v, 187-189. 
29Pe. commemoratIve coins were issued by the anoient Greeks. 
Though not absolutely impossIble, it 1s hIghly improbable that 
they would be issued here. 
under the dcmir..a tior;. of the l'eloponnos J:~ns. Simi.l8, i:"ly ¥Ii th the 
co:tna~e of Mer;;a.ra. lo'rom thE, fact that t\1C money oftb.at c Ity was 
not Inscrlbcd at this periJd, we can tell very liti.le ab0ut its 
hi.story; but, in all l1kell11ood, r'.~egara retaIned its indepondence 
during the ten or so years that it spont in the Athenian a.1119.nce, 
and so little InJ'luence would h.Ave been felt in its (~oinaGe. 
But we obtain quite strong substantlatlon for If::r.lcydides' 
~lccount in the coinnge of ralph! after the Sacred::iar, ~ln t}1.8 
ccrlnaf~e at Boootia after the 1"ev01 t of 447. ll...'1d in the C o1.:lage of 
Euboea after 4h6. 'l"ha issues of Samoa after th.e ~jarr.:tan ','.ar form 
a small history in tho'11801ves. Fur-thor.'no!'e, numismatics adds to 
Thucyd1des' narrative in at least two places, when It tells us 
of th~ I:'ecree of C learehu3 In 4.l~9 and its efft:1ctt veneS3 an.:! of 
the coinage concessions in the No:rth after the San1.a.r:' ·,';/qr. 'jJhlle 
we ca."1not ver:i.fy so hifiih Ii percentage of' event!) from this porlod 
as we could for the previa'll.3 :)driod treated in chapter two, still 
the numismatic evidence nOW~lera contradicts Thucydldeu t chronicle. 
Ptlrt,hel'1"1ore, while the colnage does p(>int out carta in :);':11!'H3iollS 
h'l tho td.s tory,. these see~. v::;. be in keepln,~: wl th J:htlC:rd '1de3 t 
prl~.nnr:r concern wi th poll t5.c,0.1 and mill tu:ry hi stOI'j' an.c:. c ;-mld be 
reasona.bly defended trOn'l tae. t point of view. 
At tho presaut s'cago of' our ne,rratlve, we will r~st content 
\1'11. th poin til::;; out the pSl"alle 11sms between Thucydides flnd r:ul!ils-
mattos.,','e need not exu€'ct them to coincide perfectl:r" hut w('~ 
will taJ(6 up their vtU'10U3 discrepancies in more detail In the 
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final chapter of this thesis. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE HISTORY OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE: 432-416 B.C. 
" •• " I" '\ ' , XClI eO';lV 0 'f(OheIlO' oux 01{I\CA)V ';0 1th£OV, 
<b.Aa OCl'f(dvT)'. 
--Thuc7dides, I, 83, 2. 
In the ninth chapter of his second book, Thucydides gives 
us a lineup of the parties which would participate in the great 
war about to take place. Thus, in 431, we oan gain some impres ... · 
sion of the size of the Athenian Empire, when we see that its 
roster oomprises: 
••• the Chlans, Lesbians, Plataeans, the Messenians 
of Naupaetus, most of the Aoarnanians, the Coroyraeans, 
the Zaoynthians, and in addition the cities which were 
tributary in the following oountries: the seaboard of 
Caria, the Dorians adJaoent to the Cartans, Ionia, the 
Hellespont, the districts on the coast of Thraoe, ahd 
the islands which lie between the Peloponnesus and 
Crete toward the east, with the exception of Melos and 
Thera. Of these the Chians, Lesbians, and Coroyraeans 
f'urn1shed ships, the rest infantry and money. Such 
were the allies of eaoh si~e and the preparations they 
made for the war.1 
We can vouch for the aocuracy of this Thuoydidean list in at 
leas t some degree by the following evidence taken from coinage. 
First .e might divide the list into two parts: the allies 
mentioned by name (e.g., the Chiana, Lesbians, etc.) and those 
111, 9, 4-6. 
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mentioned by ~egion only (e.g., Carlan seacoast, adjacent Dorians, 
etc.) The fl~st sectlon of the 11st, comp~ls1ng seven names in 
. 
all, Is made up by what we have elsewhe~e called allles of the 
flrst class, namely those enjoylng complete independence and pay-
ing no trlbute, but furnishing thelr own ships and soldie~y. 
Chios, the first name 1n this section, was never conquered by 
Athens; her coinage remalned contlnuous from the Persian wars 
down through the fourth century. Lesbos was likewise still mint-
ing in 431, and she would continue to do so down to the revolt 
which Mllned her 80me three years later. Plataea was such a 
small town that it dld not normally issue coinage during the 
fifth century; hence we can find no evidence on either stde here. 
The Messenians, after escaping from Ithome, had settled at Nau-
pactus only around 460 and had employed Athenian coinage from the 
date of their founding out ot gratitude to their Attie protectors. 
Of the towns in Acarnania, only Leucaa and Anactorium were large 
enough to issue their own coins during the fifth century; and in 
neither of these cities is there seen any decline in minting dur-
ing the course of the century. Corcyra has left us a steady 
aeries of cow-and-calf coins from 585 B.C. down to 338 B.C.; and 
Zacynthus likewise continued to mint her Apollo-tripod pieces 
from the sixth through the fourth centuries. Hence, whatever 
allies mentioned by name in this section, if they did issue coin-
age, continued to do so during the fifth century up until at 
least this time--a good indication that they were members in good 
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standing among the first-ola8s or independent allie8.2 
On the other hand, when we look at the coinage of the regions 
mentioned in the second list, we find that many states which had 
minted in earlier days had ceased to do so by 431. We Vlill men-
tion a few cities of eaoh re~ion by way of example. In Caria, 
Cheraoneaus, Halicarnassus, Iasus, and Termera had stopped issuing 
yet it is noteworthy that Aspendus, Celender!s, and Lycia had not 
ceased. This latter fact is perhaps indicative of the trouble 
that -Athens had in controlling Carla, suggested certainly by its 
refusal to pay the tribute when an additional levy was attempted 
in 428/7 during the revolt of Lesbos. In the nearby Dorian r e-
gions, Astypalaea, Calymna, Camlrus, Carpathus, Cos, Ialysus, and 
Lindus were no longer minting; only Cnldus was allowed to strike 
a few coins, but it had been forced to switoh to the Attic stan-
dard. In Ionia, which should probably here be taken in a wide 
sense so as to include the Aeolian settlements in northwestern 
Asia Minor, Assus, Ephesus, Erythrae, Clazomenae, Colophon, and 
2The coinage of the Chians and Lesbians oan be verified from 
the tables in Robinson. Chios has merited special consideration 
also in Gardner, History, 250-253; Head, Hrstoria Numorum, 599-
600; and in an artiole of Gardner's: "The Finanoial History of 
Ancient Chios," The Journal of Hellenio Studies, XL, (l(20), 160-
173. A further bfOliography-on the coins of Lasbos wili be found 
later 1n this chapter. 
The bibliography for the other independent allies is: Flataea 
--Head, Ibid., 347; Naupactus.,.-Gardner, History, 285; Aoarnanians- II','!:II· 
Head, ~., 328-334 (though hnactorium itself did not come under 
the power of the Athenians untIl six years later); Corcyraeans--
Head, ~ •• 325-326; Zaeynth1an8--Head, Ibid., 429. I 
Cyme had. stopped; Phocaea, probably one of Athens' eleetrum 
cities like Cyzieus,3 Samos, permitted by the special agreement 
of 439 mentioned in the last chapter, and Teos retained their 
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m1.nting privileges. In the Helle spont I Abydus I ;'\stacus" Cherson-
esus, Dardanus, Lampsaeus, Parium, Selymbria, Seepsis, and Tenedos 
were no longer minting; there contlnued only Chalcedon, like 
Cnidus forced to issue on the Attic standard, and Cyzicus, Athenst 
link with Persian trade. In the area around Thrace to the north, 
Dikaea (Eretria), Dikaea (Abdera), Olynthus of the Chalcidlans, 
Peparethos, Potldaea, Samothrace, Sermylia, Scione, Scyros, Stag~ 
Terone, and Tinde had stopped; but Abdera, Acanthus, Maronela, 
and Neapolis continued through the fifth century--an indication, 
as in the case of Caria, that this area was not overly well under 
control, since it was one of the first areas to rebel during the 
Archidamian War Which was now getting under way. Also, in line 
wi th the concession policy of 439 j Aeneia, Aenos, t:Tende,' and 
Thasos had resumed "t.'1.elr previous ly interrupted issues; and so 
they too were minting in 4.31. The final region mentioned by Thucy-
dides in his list is the islands between Peloponnese and Crete, 
again probably taken in Q wide sense to include an area slightly 
larger than the Cyclades. In this area, we find no coins being 
3Phocaea stopped issuing silver coins during the fifth cen-
tury, probably to preserve the Athenian monopoly in that sphere. 
But she was obviously allDwed to go on minting electrum coins and 
may have been, like Cyzious, one of Athens' centers for minting 
Thaslan gold. (Head, ~., 588-589). 
issued at Aegina, Andros, Carthaea, Carystus, Coresia, Delos, 
Eretria, Iulis, Naxos, Paros, Serlphos, Slphnos, and Tenos--
all of which had previously coined. Thera, though independent 
in 431, was soon badgered into paying tribute by the Athenians. 
It is interesting to note that Athens !leld almost complete sway 
in this territory, as compared with defaulters in other tribute 
areas. Hence we can in a sense understand her anger against Melos. 
which alGne continued to de.fy her authority and remained inde-
pendent and coining until 416.4 
Henoe we can see that Thuoydides' list of allies and their 
relegation to th eir respecti ve groupings as dependent or inde-
pendent is well substantiated by numismatic evidence. We might· 
even venture to assert that the numismatic picture in some respeots 
affords us a clearer view of the condition of the Athenian Empire 
In 431, since it indIcates where Athens' power was weak, i.e., in 
, 
Lycia and Thrace, and where it was strongest, i.e., in the islands. 
This was the state of the empire at the commencement of hos-
tilities. At this point, it might be good for us to reiterate 
our purpose in this thesis--not to summarize t.lJ.e history of Thucy-
dides in its entirety, but only t'~ose is ala ted parts which deal 
with the growth or decline of the Athenian Empire. Hence in '~he 
following, quite sketchy account of the war itself, we shall make 
no mention of such military activities as the Spartan invasions 
4The extent of the oessations in coinage among the dependent 
allies may be found in Robinson's tables. 
of Attioa or various Athenian repr-isals, except where these ac-
tions might in some way affect the Empir-e. Thus we will make no 
attempt to sustain a contj.nuous narrative of the '''laX', but will 
merely strive to analyze a few somewhat scattered events. 
In the first three years of the war, 431-429, little of 
consequence happened to the empire. The Aeginetans, already 
subjects of Athens since 456, were for security reasons expelled 
in 431 from their- island; and their coinage, which had been slim 
for the past quarter-century. ceased entirely.5 In 430, Potidaea 
in Thraoe capitulated after a siege of two years. But this city 
was simply an ally in revolt and had issued no coins since 449.6 
The next b~g item of interest to an investigator of the 
Athenian Empire 1n Thuoy~ides is the Lesbian revolt, which began 
in 428. Immediately after the Spartans had staged their annual 
invasion of Attica in the spring, the whole island of Lesbos, 
except for Methymna,7 revol ted. 'fhis rebellion was not lnspired 
5The fate of Aegina is mentioned in II, 27. Her- coins of 
this time, besides being covered by the sources mentioned already 
in note 29 on page 37, are also treated in Jean Babelon, Catalo~~~ 
de la Co11eotion de Lu~es: Monnaies Grecgues (2 vols.l Paris, 
I92~, II, l09-11~ ne~ert Adolph Cahn, Grieohische MUnzen Ar-
ohalseher, Zeit (Basel, 194.1), p. 4; Joseph EckhaI, ,poctrlna bo-
rwn Y~ter~ vols.; Vlndobonae, 1792-1839), II, 22~; Ward,-sotr. 
6Potidaea and hal' ooinage are mentioned in Thuoydides II, 70; 
Bury. 408, Q. A. ~., v, 205; Gardner, Histoty. 280; Head, ~., 
212. (I.e., only the last two souroes refer to coinage.} 
7,Methymna had a special al1ianoe with Athens, evidenced by 
the Athena-head coins whioh she continued to strike throughout 
the war. (Robinson, 331-332). 
by any ill-treatment of the Lesbians by the Athenians; but the 
states on Lesbos, and especla.lly Mltylene, wished to assert 
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their freedom. The Lesbians ~lad been listed in 431 by Thucydides 
as independent allies and, as a consequence, possessed a large 
fleet of their own. Like Thasos, some thirty-five years earlier, 
Lesbos had a good chanoe of succeeding in her revolt; but, because 
of the dilatory aid from the Peloponnesians, they could hold out 
against the Athenian siage for only one year. 
A.thens was vexed w Ith the Lesbians. They had been allies 
on almost an equal footinr, with the Athenians and should have 
had no desire to revolt. Furthermore, they had chosen a par-
ticularly inopportune moment for their action, as far as Athens 
herself was concerned--when Attica was being menaced and when 
f d • 1 Po war" un s were runn~ng ow.~ Consequently, the Athenian assem-
bly decided on the maxitmxm penalty for tho rebels: to kill all 
the adul t males and to sell the rest of the population ihto slav-
ery_ On reconsideration, however, of this impassioned decision. 
they decided on a more clement course. namely that of taking over 
the island in the name of Athens and then renting the territory 
8Thucydldes tells us in III. 19, 1-2 that the Athenians had 
to levy an extraordinary tribute to meet the added expenses of 
the Lesbian campaign. They sent twelve ships around to the 
various allies to collect more money. These vessels met with 
some success, except in Ca.ris. 'Where the envoys were attacJ~ed and 
their le ader killed. MeanwhIle. at home, Athens, desperate with 
the length ot siege, levelled her first ta~opd or property tax 
to raise more funds for the prosecution of the war against the 
recalcitrant Lesbians. 
I 
I 
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back to the origInal Lesbian owne1"8.9 
Naturally, atter the surrender and subjection of the island, 
Mltylene intermitted her abundant issues of both silver and elec-
trum atter 427. She would resume these only after beIng released 
trom the Empire towards the end of the century.10 
For the next six years, down to the end of the first decade 
of the war, most of the events touching on the Athenian Empire 
were small and comparatively insign1f1cant. In 427, Notium, the 
port c1ty of COlophon, revolted. It was quickly recaptured and 
then colon1zed by an Athenian commission. Notium, as a port city, 
had issued no colns herselt, but had been employing the coins of 
Colophon, which had stopped after the Decree of Clearchus. l1 
Also 1n 427, the island ot Minoa 1n tront of Megara was cap-
tured and fortified by the Athenians) it was too small to issue 
colnage.12 Corc,-ra too,one of the Independent allies, was In a 
state of Internal turm.oil thN>ugh dissension between the~ollgarchsJ 
9Th. historical 81de ot the Lesbian revolt Is handled In 
Thucydide., III, 2-19 and 25-29; B~y, 413-4171 £. A. y., v, 213-
218) Charles Norris Coohrane, Thuoydide! and theSo!ence of Hls-
!2.r.! (Oxford, 1929), 123-121.U Hermann Mill!er-nraSlng, "!h"ii&ar-
aeTioh~ ~or8~hunsel (Wlen, 1881), 149-0154. 
lOsouroes on Mltylenian coinage are: Gardner, Historz, 253-
2551 Head, Ibid., 557-5591 George MacDonald, In! E!olntlon ot 
00ln ~.s TCiiiibridge, 1916}, P,P. 14-15, Robinson,' 11r"3,j!hWard, 
Il54=1 I and Warwiok Wroth, Catalosse ot . .tM Griii Coins .2! Troas, AGolis, and Le.bos (London, 1894), pp.-rxrr=lxv • 
---;..;;;..;; .... 
llThuoydldes, III, 34; Head, ~.J 569-570 torm the biblio-
graphy tor Notlum. 
12Minoa is mentioned in III, 51. 
I, 
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who were pro-Peloponnesian, and the democrats, who were pro-Athe-
nian. The Athenian party eventually won out; and Corcyra remained 
independent as berore. l ) In the same year, Plataea fell after 
a long siege; and her remaining cit1zens fled to Athens.14 As 
mentioned above, though an independent ally, she was too small to 
issue her own coins. And, late 1n the summer, an Athenian fleet 
left for Sicily, ostensibly to help the natives of Leontini and 
their allies, who were Ionians, being oppressed by the Doric 
Syracusans. 15 
While in Sicily during the next year, 426, this fleet gained 
two new adherents to the Athenian cause. Messene and Mylae, a 
town belonging to the Messenians, submitted to Athenian troops. 
Since these cities revolted the very next year, we cannot tell 
whether or not their capture had any effect upon their coinage. 16 
The year 426 also marked an abortive attempt to capture 
Melos. An Athenian force landed and ravaged the island: But the 
Melians, sare in their walled city, defied the superior forces an 
retained the1r liberty. The Athenians soon withdrew. l7 
13Corcyra's sedition is treated in: III, 69-85; Bury, 419-
421; £. !. ~., V, 220-222. 
last stand is recorded in III, 52-68; £. A. g., 14 Pla taea t s 
V, 219-220. 
15111, 86. 
16111, 90. 
11111, 91. 
In the same year, troubles broke out In Ambracia and Acar-
nania in the western part of Greeoe on either side of the Ambraci 
Gulf. The Athenians and the Peloponnesians intervened to help 
their favorite contestants. But soon, the Ambraciots, the allies 
of the Peloponnesians, were worsted. A treaty which provided for 
a peace of one hundred years' duration for this territory was 
then concluded; but the truce excluded Ambracian Anactorium. 18 
In the following year, 425, Messene and Mylae successfully 
revolted from Athena, being helped by Syracuse and other Lacedae-
monian allies.19 Then Anactorium was taken by the A'thenians 
and the Acarnanians. But this city, which was sltuated just a 
rew miles east from the later famous Actium, seems to r~ve passed 
under the control of the Acarnanians and hence did not cease its 
colnage. 20 
Likewise in 425 sweeping ohanges were made in the Athenian 
tribute lists. Although no now crisis is implied by th~ Thucy-
didean narrative, the quota lists from the Acropolis tell us that 
the former exactions were in most instanoes doubled or even 
trebled at this time. Also about one hundred new names were added 
to the lists, includIng the formerly recalcitrant Melos. 
18The di ff ieul ties in Ambrac ia and Aearnania are tree. ted in 
III, 102 and 105-114; Bury, 422-423; £. !. ~., v, 227-230. 
19The early defection of Messene and My1ae is told in IV, 1. 
20The capture of Anactorium is mentioned in IV, 1+9; Bury, 
425. The coins are rererred to by Head, ~., 329. 
I 
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This would seem to pose two difficulties wi th Thucydides' 
account. First, he implies in his treatment of the con-:-tuest of 
Malos in book five that the year L ..16 marked the f irat successful 
Athenian attempt to subdue that island. Secondly, Thucydides 
does not even hint at a reason why such excessive increases in 
tribute should have been demanded. 
In sol ving the first of these problems, we should remark 
that the financial records of the Athenians are official docu-
menta; and hence their reliability as objective evidence would 
seem to be highly preferable to that of Thucydides. They would 
have no pOint to be gained by falsification, While the same 
could not be sa.id of a literary historian. The solution to this 
difficulty is relatively simple. Neither the documents nor 
Thucydides are at faul t. The documents merely record the assess-
ment made and not necessarily its payment; thus there 1s no evi-
, 
dence that Melos ever paid at all. And it is generally assumed 
that many of the names added in 425 to the quota lists were just 
a matter of wishful thinking on the part of the Athenians and that 
those who were not forced to pay did not do so. Hence a record 
of assessment with no record of payment plus the continuing coin-
age of the island would hardly seem to indict Thucydides of fraud 
in any sense. 2l 
21The tribute lists of 425 are treated in Bury, 428-429; 
£. !. g., V, 236.231) Meritt, !. 1. ~., III, 288.289. 
As to the second problem, the SUlSwep is aga.in reasonably 
obvious. After seven seasons of unabated warfare, tl18 Athenian 
finances would 'naturally be ruxming loW', supporting as they were 
at least t}~ee separate theaters of operation. Hence the re-
vised tribute list need not surprise anyono. (frle fact that 
Thucydides does not mention the crisis, e.s he had trw provious 
finanoial difficmltles during the revolt of Lesbos, may stom from 
the faot that t'1e add! tional money was raIsed t..'lrourh tho ord1.-
nary ohannels of tribute, which ho seldom ~~ntlons, while the 
Lesbian monGY had been obtained tnroupJ'\ an exceptional property 
tax of the Athenian people. 
During the years 425 and 424, Attlens began capturing small 
"va.ntage points around the Peloponne.e whichwould enable her 
raiders to strike deep into Spartlin territory. She fortified 
ancient Pylos in 425 and took over the island of Cythera, slightly 
southeast of the Laoonian Gulf, in 424. Pylos, of oourse, was 
not ~urNntly inhabited and issued no ooins. Cythera did not 
begin to mint her own ourrency until the third oentury before 
Christ. Henoe W6 are unable to verify e1 ther of these small ac-
quisitions. 22 
22Pylos and Cythera might not be class5.fled as belonglnc 
striotly to the Empire. s~.noo they were captured ohiefly for 
strateg10 reasons. Cythera pa1d little tribute; Pylos could not. 
Pyloa 1s treated in IV. 3 ft.; Bury. 429-438; c. A. g •• v, 230-
235. Cythera Is treated in IV. 53-;;7; Bury. 4!B: Q.. i. li., V. 
238-2391 hett coins in Head. Ibld., 4.3t>. 
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Beginning also in 424, when the supreme strategist of Sparta, 
the eeneral Brasidas, began his operations in the regions around 
Thrace, the Athenians suffered a series of reverses in this 
northern area. First, Acanthus and Stagira, fired by Spartan 
promises of aid, staged suocessful revolts In 424. Aoanthus, 
whose strength had probably ~lven it special consideration with 
regard to the Decree of Clearehus, since it had never stopped 
minting, went off the Attic standard at this time and adopted 
the Phoenician standard for its bull-and-lion colns. This stan-
dard was much more useful for trade with the East, especial11 
in the faoe of the waning power of Athens in the northern area. 
Stagira did not resume her ooinage until the fourth oentury.23 
At this point in his narrative, Thucydides relates another 
Athenian attempt to gain Boeotia, whioh failed. 24 
Before the year 424 was over, the historian himself makes 
his principal appearanoe 1n the pages of his history, in connec-
tion with further events in the Thracian region. The Spartan 
Brasidas, together with his newly acquired northern allies .. made 
an expedition against Amphipolls, an Athenian colony on the river 
Strymon, a few miles inland from Eion. 25 Both Elon and Amphipolis 
were at this time the responsibility of the general Thucydides, 
the eo~~ander of the northern distriot, who was stationed at 
23Aoanthus an~. ~taglra are treated in IV. 8L-88; Bury, h16-447; £. !. !., V, 244; Aoanthus' ooins in Heaa, ~., 204-205. 
24 IV , 89-101. 
25 
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Thaaos--a distance ot half a day away by boat. One cold. snowy 
night. Brasldas found the bridge to Amphipolls not well guarded 
and the city generally unprepared for an attaok. He quiokly 
manned the bridge and proceeded to assault the town itself. The 
people at once sent out a message to Thucydidea to oome to their 
rescue. He sailed 1mmediately after receiving the news and ar-
rived at the mouth of the Strymon on the evening of the next day. 
& 
Meanwhile. the people of Amphipolis, unaware that Thucydides 
was so near at hand with help, had surrendered to Brasidas. 
Thucydldes, however, managed to preserve Elon by hls timely ar-
rival. a rew short hours before Brasldas marched there too. It 
was the dlsgrace attendant on the loss of the Athenian Amphlpolis 
through insufficient guarding that oaused the exile of 'l'hucydides 
and was indirectly responsible for the writing of the history that 
we possess. 26 
Beoause Amphipolls was a colony of the Athenians themselves, 
it had utilized the regular Athenian money before this date. 
And now in 424. even after its autonomy--for Sparta did not make 
it a Spartan subject, but allowed it freedom. i.e., freedom to 
26Brasidas was a clever general. He 1mew that Thucydides 
was in the neighborhood and that he had the ri~~t of working the 
gold mines in that part of Thrace (inherited from Olorus, his 
father) and hence probably possessed some influence wi th t1:le 
natives of cities around Amphipolls, and, as a result, would be 
able to collect a sizable force to oppose him. 
Therefore Brasidas struck quickly, offered easy tO~18, and 
accepted the surrender of Amphipolis while its people were still 
somewhat irresolute. 
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fight with 3parta--it did not begin immediately to strike coins. 
Only after its independence was definitely established by the 
treaty of Nloias 1n 421, did it begin the issue of the beautiful 
Arethusa-head pieces, which have won universal acclaim for their 
high artistic value.27 
After these losses, Athens was beginning to become worried 
about the future of the northern section of her Empire. And so, 
to have time to strengthen her position, she concluded in the 
spring of 423 a one-year truce with Sparta. Athens hoped in this 
way to be abl e to make leisurely prepara tiona to regain her los t 
territory 1n Thraoe, while BrasIdaa would be hindered from foment-
ing any further revolts. And, on the other hand, Sparta hoped 
that perhaps durIng the course of the year Athens would be willing 
to negotiate a peace treaty of longer duration.28 
But before the news of the tl"'Uce reached the north, Brasldas 
had already helped Scione to revolt. The Athenians clarmed that 
the rebellion had taken place after the actual date of the armis-
tice and demanded that the town be handed back. Brasidas, in-
sisting that the revolt had taken place before the treaty, re-
fused. And Mende, a town on the same peninsula, encouraged by 
27Amphipol1s 1s mentioned in IV, lJ2-108j Bury, 447-448; 
.2,. A, • .!!., v, 244-245; Ca.vaignac, LtEcono!n&,! Grecgl1e (Paris, 1951), 
p. 93. Its coins are treated in ~ardner, History, 274-280; Head, 
Ibid., 214-217. 
28The truce of 423 is mentioned in IV, 11'(-119; Bur;)", 450-451: Q. !. ~., v, 246. 
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Brasidas' resolute stand, took this opportunity to join in the 
revolt. Bras1das accepted this town into the Spartan alliance, 
charging at the same time that the Athenians had violatedt;he 
truce in other rna tters. 
At this juncture, the future of the northern Empire might 
have taken an entirely different turn, had not Brasidas been 
called away to battle some nat! ve Macedonians further to the north. 
Deprived of help, Mende once more fell into Athenian hands; and 
Scione was circumvallated and held in a state of siege by an 
Ath~nian guard. It fell about two years later, and an anpry 
Athens slew all its males and enslaved the women and children. 
For its brief period of freedom, however, it resumed its minting 
which it had stopped in 449. Mende, however, even after its pre-
sent troubles with the imperial c1ty, continued its coinage prtvi-
leges; but it had amays employed the Attic standard, and this 
might explain some of Athens' leniency towards it. 29 
In 422, when the truce of the preceding year had formally 
expired, Glean, the general responsible fOl" the si.'mal ;\thenian 
success at Pylas three years earlier, led an expedition to recover 
Amphipolls. In the subsequent battle for possession of the city, 
both he and Bras1das were killed~O Thus, althouph the Athenian 
;..;. 29Scion8 and Mende are referred to in IV, 120-129; ~ury, 4si .. 451:,; Q. A. R., v, 246.247. 1~eir coins are treated 1n Robinson,-
33l~33S. 
30The battle at Amphipolis in 422 1s mentioned in V, 6-11; 
Bury, 453-455; Q. !. !., v, 248. 
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troops were routed, tho Peloponneslan victory amounted to a 
practical defeat because of' the deat~ of their leader. Also, wi t 
the death of Cleon, the war pa.rty at Athens was considerabl:.'" 
weakened; and the peace faction, with Nicias at their head, was 
easily ~ble to conclude a more lasting treaty in the following 
year. 
This treaty of 421, which was supposed to inaugurate an era 
of peace which would last for fifty years, had the following 
terms arrectlng the Empire: (1) Athens would restore Pylos, 
Cythera, and a few other small posts to Sparta, but would retain 
Anactorium, Nlsaea, and Sollion; (2) Sparta would restore Amphi-
polis, Stacira, Acanthus, and some other small towns in Thrace 
to Athens; (3) Boeotia would restore the fortress of Panacton 
to the Athenians; (4) the tOv.,.11S mentioned in section two above 
would remain independent, but would pay tribute to Athens.31 
• But it was obvious at once that this peace CQu1c, not be 
durable. Three large and il"1portant states in tho Pelc~ponne.sian 
alliance rejected the terms of the agreement. Corinth did ~ot 
like the idea of Anactorlum, her colony, being l{ept by the 
Athenians. Boeotia. did not want to surrender Pnnacton with 
nothing gained in return. Megara did not fancy her port Nisaea 
remaining in Athenian h~~ds. Furthermore, the Chalcidians re-
fused to surrender Amphipolis; so most of the condi tions of the 
31For the complete terms of this treaty confer V. 17 .. 20. 
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original treaty bogged down. 32 
Sparta, however, was anxious, to get back hflr prisoners 
from the battle of Sphacteria., where 292 of her men ha.d surrendered 
to the Athenians. She was also eager to put aside all enmity 
with Athens because her treaty with Argos, her old rival on the 
Peloponnese, was soon to run out; and she did not relish the 
idea of having to wage two all-out wars. Athens, on the other 
hand, wan ted an end of Spartan tampering in her .Empire. So the 
two states made a separate treaty: Athens agreed to excha~ee 
captives witrl Sparta, but kept Pylos and Cythera. With this 
alliance, whi~~ was also supposed to last fifty years, ended 
the first ten years of war.33 
The treaty was reasonably successful in maintaining peace 
for a period of a bout five years. During this time Sparta and 
Argos clashed at the battle of Mantinea in h18, where the 
Athenians aided the Argives. Both were routed by the Spartans. 
After this defeat, a revision was made in the government of Argos; 
and that state's new foreip:n policy was responsible for an al-
llancs with Sparta. With the addition of this new, powerful 
ally, Sparta regained som~ of her prestige lost a~ Sphacteria; 
and many of the other towns among her friends in tho Peloponnese_ 
who had refused to support her in her treaty of' h2l, bep;an once 
32Por the re.1 e e ti on of the firs t trea ty , confer V, 22 • 
. 33For the final treaty confer V, 22-25. For both treaties, 
see also Bury, 455-459; 2.. t::.. !i., V, 249-256. 
more to rally behind her. 34 
Then, in the year 416, ocourred the Malian affair. As has 
been remarked earlier in this chapter, Melos was at thll"! time the 
one island in the Cyclades that was still standinr.r, firm 8.9;ainst 
the dominq,t.1on of Athens. Its solitary aloofness VIas reGa.rded 
by the Athenians w.tt~ mixed feelings of indiznatlon and hatred. 
They felt that it stood as a bad example to the other islands, 
who mir-llt be encouraged by its independent ex13tence to holt from 
the1.r roles as dutiful sub.1eots. 
At this point in the narratIve, Thucydides entertains us 
with that litera!'y masterpieoe which has become known as the 
Malian Dialogue. In that interohange of speeohes, supposedly 
!,9corded when p!'ior to invas.1 on the Athenian envoys had fore-
warned the Malians of the advantages of a bloodless surrender of 
their isand, he skillfully portrays the arguments nnd emotions 
on both sides. The Athenian Jpp,~ exhibited 'on this occasion 
has often been inte!'preted as the tragic flaw of the main charac-
ters of this Thucydidean trr3!sdy;35 and the Mellans fru!.tlessly 
appealed to mo!'al arguments of' justice and !'icpt to sta~r the 
hands of the empire builders. 
34Also in 417, Athens made another unsuccessful attempt to re-
gain Amphipolis (V l 83). A ninor revolt of Dlum on ~,~t •. ~ thos 
also occurred (V, tl2); but tJ"lis town did not issue coins, and 
Thucydides tells us nothing of the outcome of the revolt. 
3.5Confer John H. Pinley, Jr., Thucyclides (Cambrdl~e, 1942), 
pp. 321 ft. for a balanoed treatment of the element of tragedy 
in the his toria.n' s narra ti ve. 
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Unfortunately for the Malians, the Spartans at this time 
were still conscientiously observ1ngthe truce and thus did not 
w:ish to help the islanders, though they were originally Lacedae-
monian colonists. '!he hapless city was surrounded, besieged, and 
taken. As on other aU8plclous oeoas ions, th(;} it thanlans r.lassacred 
all the adult Males and. sold the weaker !nhabi tants as :slaves_ 
They then proceeded to colonize tho island themselves,,~~J 
Thus, a1'tor h16, the old pomegranate clvic coinare of :<0108, 
the only vestige of' 1ndependence le.ft 1n the islands, disappeared. 
It would be resumed, however, after 400, vmen Lysa!~er restored 
a remnant o.f the orig1nal population to their home.37 
Recapitulating the events of the years 431-416, co~~only 
spoken of as the Ax-ohldamia.n :Var and the Peace of Nic1as, 1s not 
any easy task. Many happenings whioh touched upon the b..mplre 
were too small ;to leave an impression on co1nage, e.~i., the fall 
of Plataea, the revolt of' N'ottura, the capture of Minoa, 'Cythera, 
and Pylos. And other events were of too brief duration to achieve 
any such effect, e.g., the domination over Messana and ?F.ylae 
in SicIly. Yet, none,·lass, certain oocurrences did leave thelr 
traces in co:1nar,e--the depopulatIon of JI.ee:lna, the revolt of Las-
bos, the secession of' Acanthus, the successful stru~gle of Amphl-
36Th.e his tory of ~<!elos is 1"'818. ted in V, 84-116; Bury, 1~62-
£.. 11- li., V, ~2Al; Cocllrane, 113-114_ 
37The coins of Melos are lIsted in Qtu'dner HlstorJ.;, 21+4-
Head, ~., 486-487; Hoblnson, 329 and 33~; Weil, 362-361+_ 
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polis for independence, and the crushing of Melos. And once 
again we may state that the numismatic evidence does not contra .. 
dict the account of Thucydldes, but even in some instances, e.g., 
the relative power of Athens :In certain areas in 431, and tho tri-
bute increases of 42$, supplements the historical narrative. 
CHAPTER V 
THE HISTORY OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIHE: 4,16-411 B.C. 
et O£ ~l~ u~£pox~a xep-
. ~ ... ' , OlY " ~oy~ xopeue~a" 
A{xa~ a~op~o~, 0&0~ 
Oa,~oywy lo~ ol~Y, 
xQ.xd Y 1 Y SAO I ~o \1.0 r po. 
Ouo~o~~ou XdplY X)',6~~. 
--Sophocles, Oedipus Rex, 
883-888. 
During the winter of 416/5, the Athenian people were feeling 
confident after their reoent triumph at Melos. Throughout six 
years of peace their revenues had continued to pile up until 
their treasury now possessed a considerable surplus. Under these 
conditions they felt safe in disobeying Pericles' wise counsell 
not to expand their Empire during war. For they were not even 
sure that they could be 88. -t.:-l to be a.t war, s inca the treaty wi th 
Sparta had been effeotive over such a long period of time. 
The opportunity for the Athenians to use their savings came 
towards the end of 416. Segesta, a city in SiCily, had been at 
war with her more powerful southern neighbor, Selinus. Coming 
orf second best in the contest did not please the Segestians, so 
they deoided to call on the Athenians for help. They got the 
111, 65. 1. 
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democrats trom Leontini, the rormer allies or the Athenians who 
had been responsible ror the earlier imperial expedition to the 
~sland in 427, to back their petition and sent a legation to 
Athena requesting aid. At the same time, they ofrered to pay 
any expenses that an Athenian expedition mir~t incur. 
As a result of this visit, Athenian envoys were sent out to 
inVestigate the financial position of the Segestians, to ascer-
tain whether or not they could arford to support a fUll-fledged 
Athenian expedition in the manner to ~hich they had beoome ac-
customed. The Athenian exploratory envoys were entertained lavUh-
ly in Sagesta and returned home bearing tales of ~~told wealth. 
It was only later that the Athenians discovered that many or the 
solid gold vessels seen in the temples were really gilt silVer 
and that the sumptuous service used in the homes of the private 
citizens of Segesta had been passed from house to house between 
entertainments on each nl~pt. Furthermore, the Segestians had 
borrowed from many of the neighboring cities in Sicily silver and 
gold vessels to impress the Athenian emissaries. trhe ruse worked. 
The Athenians fitted out 134 triremes and an even larger number 
of smaller attendant vessels and sailed westward for what looked 
like a glorious chance to expand their Empire. 
It is hard to see how such an expedItion could have failed 
so completely and so miserably. The Sicilians and especially the 
Syracusans, on whom the brunt of the defensive war eventually 
eVolved, were not prepared for war and could hardly have had on 
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hand anywhere near the resources that Athens could muster. But 
fail the expedition did. It lingered for over two years on the 
island and finally perished 1n its entirety, dragging with it 
even more numerous reinforcements both of ships and men t ha thad 
been sent out froM Attica froM time to time. 
Several reasons, however, c an be pointed out for tl1is fail-
ure. There was, of course, t."'1e actual poverty of the S~gestians, 
discovered only after the expeditionary force had made ~le long 
journey. Then, the Italian allies of the Athenians, on whose 
help they had been counting to some extent, refused to embroil 
themselves In a war against Selinus and Syracuse. Then too, a 
large portion of the blame could be fixed on Nicias, the command-
ing general for the greater part of the campaign. As we saw in 
the last chapter, Nicias was a member of the peace party; and he 
was highly reluctant to embark on the enterprise even when the 
• Athenian people had elected him a general. His co-commander, 
the young Alcibiades, was supposed to provide the spark for the 
forces; but he was recalled to Athens early in the campai~n to 
stand trial for the mutilation of the Hermae and fled to Sparta 
when he found that he was more than likely to be condemned. 
Nicla.s, left in charge of the expedition, assorted his cautious 
nature only enough to take smaller cities like Catana and deferred 
the attack on Syracuse, the main objective, until that city had 
built up an adequate defense. And even when he eventually did 
invest the city, he delayed a.ction until the Syracusans had 
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built a counter-wall around him and there was no loncer any hope 
of victory. The final piece of hesitation on his part ca.me when 
an unpropitious eclipse of the moon occurred on the nlr:ht when 
he should have evacuated his troops by boat from his surrounded 
fortiflcat ions; this las t delay cost '-Athens the vthole Sicilian 
.force and afforded Syracuse its unparalleled victory in L;13.2 
Some aspects of the SIcilian campaign are reflected in the 
island's coinage of the period. Syracuse at itl lowest ebb, when 
surrounded by Athenian and hostile Sicilian forces,3 was forced 
to issue wbat is commonly termed gold money of necessity, that is, 
coins put out by melting down temple vessels--a last resort in 
a city that normally issued silver.4 Then, after its decisive 
Victory, it oelebrated its triumph by issuing beautiful silver 
pieoes, whioh deserve to rank among the finest in the artistic 
world and which call to mind the even more skillfully exeouted 
Demareteia issued by the city after Himera in 480. These ten-
drachm medallions, with their heads of Persephone, their lifelike 
four-horse chariots, and the water-nymph Arethusa encircled by 
dolphins, were done by the Sicilian artists Cimon and Evaenetus, 
who Bury says "may claim to stand in the same rank as Phidias. ,,5 
2The history ot the Sicilian expedition is treated in Thucy-
dides VI-VII; Bury, 477-485; Q. !. i., V, 282-311. 
3VII, 48, 5. 
4The same thing would happen to a besieged Athens some six 
ye arB la ter • 
5n liB}, 
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Head spends two full pages describing these masterpieces. 6 
Two other cities in Sicily likewise reflect an interesting 
change in their coinage at this time. Catana, whiCh Thucydides 
tells us was one of the Athenian bases of operations against 
Syracuse, minted after its capture in 415 some of its finest 
coins during the Athenian occupation.7 And even Segesta seems 
to have put forth some of its best coins with many striking 
varieties between the years 415 and 409. some would sea here the 
hand of a borrowed Athenian artist at work. 8 
During his narrative of the Sicilian expedition, Thucydides 
g-ives us a list of the all les of the Empire who were fighting 
with the Athenians before Syracuse. This document Is too lengthy 
to quote hero in its entirety because the historian intersperses 
some commentary along with many of the names. We can, however, 
quote the individual districts mentioned by Thucydides as al11es 
at this time and confer their coinage records to whether we can 
subs.tantlate his list as we dld for the one of 431 in chapter 
6The coins of Syracuse are treated 1n Comparetti 28.29; 
Gardner, History, 4oS; Head, Historia ~umorum, 171-178; G. F. 
Hill, aistorica1 Greek Coins lLondon, 1906), p. 54; MacDonald, 
Coin TYpes, 9. C. T. §e1tman, Masterpieces, 18-20; Alfred von 
~a11et, ~ Ant~ken MQpzen (Berlin, 1909), pp. lS-lB. 
7The coins of Catana are discussed in Gardner, Ibid., 282-
Head, l£!S., 132-133. 
8The coins of Segesta are mentioned in Gardner, ~., 284-
Head, Ibid., 164-167. 1'1\' I 
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four. 9 
He fi~st mentions the Lemnians and Imbrians, two islands 
in the Thraclan tribute area. Lemnos struck no coi~s after the 
Persian wars until out from under Athenian domination towards the 
beginning of the fourth century. Imbros did not begin coining 
until the fourth century, so we can verify nothing from her is-
sues. Then Thucydldes lists the people from Aegina and Hestlaea, 
who were Athenian colonists since the original inhabitants had 
been expelled from these places In 431 and 446 respectively; 
both had ceased to issue coins after theIr depopulation, as we 
mentioned in the preceding chapters. 
The next group listed--the Eretrlans, Chalcidians, StJTians, 
and Carystlans--were all from Euboea. They had issued no coins 
after the suppression of their revolt in 446, as previously men-
tioned. But, in 411, after becoming united and with promised 
• Spartan aid, they would revolt; and Eretria would inaugurate a 
series of federal coinage for the whole island. 
The Ceans, Andriana, and Tenians were from the islands. The 
Ceans had switched to the Attic standard after 449; and, except 
for the festival coins for Triopian Apollo, which we alluded to 
before, they ceased minting. They would resume on their old 
standard in the fourth century. After 480, the Andrians and the 
Tenlans issued no coins during the period of Athenian supremacy 
in the Aegean. 
9The list of allies before Syracuse is in VII. 51. 2-11. 
The Mileslans, Samians, and Chians were from Ionia. The 
Milesians had been permitted by the Athenians to issue small 
coins for local oiroulation only during most of the fifth cen-
tury. They w~ld begin issuing larger denominations a8ain in 
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the fourth century. '!'he Samians had a speoial coinage arrange-
ment with the Athenia.ns, as \,e noted after their rebellion in 
41+0-439. The Chians, as 'l'hucydldes reminds us in th13 pa.ssage I 
supplied ships and were independent. Hence there is no traoe of 
Athenian domination on the coinage of this island. 
The Methymnaeans, Tenedians, and the people from Aenoa were 
all Aeollans. The Methymnae!lns, the one group on J..Iesbos that ha.d 
remained fai~hful to Athens, issued little (if an0 coinage during 
the period from 420 to 405, probably findlnr, it more convenient 
to use Athenian coin. They supplied ships and always retained 
the right of coinage, even if they did not always exercise it • 
• lNe noted above that the head of Athena sometimes appeared on 
their coins. The Tenedians issued no coins from 480 until the 
fourth oentury. The city of Aenos had not minted fz-om 44.9 to 
lj.39 because of the decree, but had been allowed to resume coinage 
after 439 with other cities of the north. 
The Rhodians are here grouped together, a lthough they were 
not federated until 409--the official date for the founding of 
the city of Rhodes. Camirus h~d Issued didrachms and drachms on 
the Aeginetan standard, but had ceased mintIng around 465 when 
Athenian ascendancy in southwest Asia Minor was at its height 
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after the battle of Eurymedon. Lindus had formerly minted on the 
Phoenician standard, but, under Attic supremacy, issued only a 
few hemidrachms and obols of Athenian weight. Ialysus had also 
employed the Phoenician standard in the sixth century; and it is 
doubtful whether it issued any staters after 465. All in all, 
coinage on the island was very scarce during the Athenian Empire. 
The Cytherians lived on a small island and, as noted before, 
issued coins only during the third and second centuries. The 
Cephallenians and Zacynthians went as independent allies and hence 
showed no coinage restrictions. Cephallenia used the coins of 
Corcyra, and the coins of Zacynthus show no break during this 
period. The Corcyreans had always been strong independent allies 
of Athens, ann their'coins are continuous from 585. The Messen-
lans from Naupactus and Pylos used Athenian coins, as mentioned 
earlier, out of gratitude to their benefactors. 
The next groups listed were for the most part voludteers or 
mercenaries and do not reflect any determinate policy of their 
native ctty--the exiles from Megara. Argives, Mant1neans, Ar-
cadians, Cretans, and Aetolians. No reflection of their move-
ments would be vis ible in numlsma tics. The Thurlans and Meta-
pontians b 0 ttl went only because they were forced to by party 
dissensions within t.'letr own cities; and, if they refused, 
Athens mif:ht come .and ta.ke over the towns completely during 
their faction. They retained their sovereignty by their coopera-
tion, and no break in the coinage of either is noted. II 
III·· ' 
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or the Sioilians who were Greeks, the Naxiana and Catanians 
are listed. The Naxians do not seem to have been molested by 
the Athenians, a 1 though they did begin new looal issues in 415. 
The Catanians have been treated amply above on page 83. Of the 
Sicilians who were barbarians, the Segestians were noted above 
on page 83; and the Sioels are a rather indeterminate group of 
towns--the statement of Thucydides is indefinite. It 1e probably 
true that none of the more primitive inhabitants of Sicily minted 
at this date, as might be lnferred from Head's treatment of 
Sicily in Historia Numorum. 10 
The final groups mentioned by Thucydides are agnin fragmen-
tary a.nd would have had no influence on the coinage of t.~eir 
respeotive oities. So the 'ryrrhenians and Iapygians '.vho par-
ticipated in the siege of Syracuse must remain unverified from 
our present standpoint.11 
• Yet all these allies achieved nothing in Slcl1y. Many of 
them perished with their Athenian leaders; and the few towns that 
they had ViOn passed ba.ck once more into the hands of the anti-
Athenian Sicilia.ns. The Athenians themselves had suffered severe 
losses. Well over two hundred of their ships had been burned or 
~---------.-----
lOpp. 114-191. 
11The chief source for the ~leririca tion of the list of allies 
~s B. V. Head, Historla Numorum, where articles on each of the 
~1 ties are lIs ted separately. Additional s ourees for Chios oan 
pe found on page 60, note 2. Head's acoount of Rhodes was sup-
plemented by Gardner's IUs torI, 255-256. 
I ~ . 
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sunk, and thei~ manpower was permanently impaired. 
Meanwhile, back in (treece, Alcibia.des had deserted to the 
Spartans. ll'here he aided tho1r cause by 3t'tggestin.r: tha.t they 
fo~tirY' Deceleia, a small torm about thirty miles nort'IJ. of' Athens. 
This place would afford a haven for runaway sla vas from the Athe-
nian silver mines at Laur1~, since they could reac~ it in ~ 
single night. In this way, the necessary manpower for Athens' 
coin output could be diminished; and her war effort would become 
seriously crippled. Sparta followed this advice of Alcibiades 
and fortified Deceleia in March 413. The cruelly treated slaves 
hastened to this station; and, by the end of that year, the mines 
~t Laurium, for all practical purposes, had ceased to oporate.12 
With the Spartans thus harassing the Athenians at Deceleia. 
the news of the utter destruction of the land and sen. forces at 
Sicily reached Athens. The populace was for a tirr!e incredulous, 
• 
refusing to believe 1hat such a doom could have befallen what had 
seemed an almost invinoible oontinr:ent. :1hen finally they were 
convinoed, they wasted no time on self-pity, but at once set 
about building more a hips nnd nr-epar1ne to defenc t!1e ir ;:;:n1pire 
to the end. l ) 
The next year, 412, found most of the Athenian subjects 
12Decelela is mentioned in Thucydides chiefly in VI, 91, 6; 
VII, 19, Ii and VII, 27. It is also treated in Bury, 485; Gardne~ 
!isto~, 231-232. 
13VIII, 1-4. 
ready to revolt. Alclbiades and the Spartans, v;,ho were no longer-
so conoerned wi th keopine the truoe wi th a weat::ened (,thana, were 
more than anxious to make the most of this disposition which was 
becoming prevalent in the Empire. So Alclbladea and Chalcideus, 
a Spart~l general, toured the Aegean world that year, indUcing 
Chios, Clazomenae, and Miletu,s to revolt from the Athenians. 
Chios 1n turn convinced the whole island of Lasbos to rebel, in-
cluding both Mltylene and Methymna.l4 
Athens acted quickly. She came unexpectedly and swiftly 
won baok Mltylene, Methymna, and Clazomenae. But then Cnldus, 
apprised of the fact that a large Peloponnesian fleet was 1n the 
area, also revolted. And the Chlana, as yet unchecked, sailed 
to Camtrus on Rhodes and stirred up the whole island to revolt b~­
fore Athens could arrive to stem the tlde. 1.5 
These ovents ot 412 were to some extent mirrored in the con-
temporary colnagc. l6 Of course, Methyrma, '~:ttyl6ne, and' Clazo-
m.nae had been tree for too short a time to permit any changes 
in this regard. Chlos, always an independent ally, had been 
141n book eight, Thuoydldes treats t!ie revolts of these 
cltles in thet'ollowing chapters: Chios (14), Clazomenae (14. 23). 
Mlletus (11), Lesboa (22, 23). 
15The recapture or Clazomenae and Leabos are mentioned In 
VIII, 23. The revolt of Cnldus 1s given In VIII, 35 and that or 
Rhodes 1n VIII, 44. Bury treats these and the preceding revolts 
on pages 481-4~BJ £. A. n. 1n V, 312-315. 
l6Ephesus $1180 revolted either now or a year or two earlier, 
a. she begins issu1ng c01n. again. This 1* found 1n Gardner, 
H1.tgrz. 251-258; Head, H!ltor1" 511-513; Robinson, 330-331. 
". 
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issuing throughout the fifth oentury, but her output seems to 
inorease in volume during the last fifteen years or so of the 
oentury. Cnidus resumed her coins in 412 on the Phoenician 
standard, after thirty-seven years of issuing on the Attic. At 
the same time, we lalOW tha t Cyme must also have revolted during 
412, from her resumption of hes eagle coinage; Thuoydides does 
not mention her revolt, though he implies that 1 twas al ready a 
free oity in VIII, 31, 4. Rhodes did not take advantage of her 
freedom at onoe, but started to issue coins only after the 
federal union of her three principal c1ties three years later.17 
Thus, in the spring of 411, the last year of the war nar-
rated by Thucydides, the Athenian Empire was 1ntact only in its 
northern regions and the Hellespont. All that remained of 1m-
portance around the western coast of Asia Minor was Lesbos, 
Samos, Cos, and Halicarnassus. Furthermore, Athens was faced 
with the harsh reality of a strong Peloponnesian fleet operating 
openly in the Aegean, supported by a still hostile Persia and 
even by some Sicilian recruits, who had reoently beoome interested 
in the outoome of this war in the East. 
11Tb.e coinage of the cities revolting in 412 are treated in 
the following: (1) Chios--Giesecfe, 68-75; Friedrioh Imhoof-Blumar 
Zur Oriechisehen und RSm!sohen Munzkunde (Geneva, 1908) pp. 79-~ Ward, 109-110; besides the sources in note 2, page ~o; (2) C 
zomenae--Head, Histori~, 567; (3) Mlletus--Gardner, li1story, 251) 
Head, Ibid., 584-5851 (4) Lesbos, ~.ethymna and M1tylene--oonfer 
note 1, page 03 and note 10, page 65; (5) Cn1dus--Gardner, Ib1d., 
258, Head, j~gd., 614-615; Robinson, 331; (6) Rhodes, Gardner, 
.!bid., 255- J Head, Ca tal.2B!!! .2! !h!. Greek Coins .2! Qaria, CO" ~hod!!, eig. (London, 1~971, PP. o-oii1; (1) Cyme--Head, Histor1a 
Nu.morum, 5 1-552. 
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Late in the spring even the little left to Athens began to 
revolt. In the Hellespont, Abydus went over to the Persians and 
was followed two days later by Lampsacus. Once again the Athe-
nians sailed quickly and retook Lampsacus, but failed to recap-
ture Abydus,18 which from that year began its famous representa-
tions of Nike, Apollo, and Artemis in gold--the chief moneta~ 
exchange of the Persian world.19 
In June 411, there was trouble in the city of Athens itself. 
The populace was becoming dissatisfied with the way in which the 
war was being conducted under the democracy. An oligarchic in-
surrection took place, and little resistance was offered to the 
new p::overnment of the :B~our Hundred. But, instead of solving the 
difficulties rampant in the vanishing Empire. the new government 
only increased them. As the democrats had done before them, the 
oligarchs favored their own brand of government in all the states 
under their control and so set up commissions to go around to the 
subject cities and establish oligarchies in each one. 
The oligal>chs held office only Wltil September.20 But in 
the spaoe of three months, they had managed to do sufficient 
damage. The new oligarchy which they had established on Samos 
compromised the loyalty of that state for a time; but the Sami8,ns 
18Abyd~9 and Lampsacu8 are treated in VIII, 62. 
19For the coins of Abydus, confer Head, His tortt, 538-.539. 
20The arrival of the Four Hundred in Athens is described 1n 
VIII, 67 rf. 
r 
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themselves, ,who seemed to be the most faithful of' the .Athenian 
allies throughout the fifth and even into the fourth century, 
righted the governmental difficulties themsel ves. For a time, 
in fact, while the oligarchs were still in control of Athens and 
attempting to make peace with the Spartans, the Athenian fleet 
and the Samians considered themselves as the only true A th{~nia.ns 
and set up their own distinctive coinage--Athenian tetradrachms 
with the head of Athena and with a small Samian bull's head in 
front of the traditional owl on the reverse. 2l 
Though Thucydldes makes no explicit mention of a revolt on 
Thasos at this date, it might easily be inferred both from the 
stability of the oligarchic government there even after the demo-
cratic restoration at Athens and from the new gold coinage22 be-
ginning in 411--an indication of friendship with the Persians. 23 
A short ttm. later, Byzantium revolted again; and, from the 
year 411, she began minting her well-known iron coins.2q 
Closer to home, an uprising on Euboea thoroughly frightened 
21The difficulties at Samos are mentioned in VIII, 72.77; 
Bury, 494; c. A. H. v, 333-334. Their coins are treated in 
E. S. G. Robinson, ATe11 EI-Mashkute Hoard of Athenian Tetra-
drachma," The Numismatig Chron1cle, 6th Series, VI (1946-1947), 118~119, and Se1tman, 6ree~ Coins, 147-148. 
22These were Thasos' first issues in r,old, despite her large 
interests in the Pangaean mines. 
23The difficulties at Thasos are troated in VIII, 64. 
24ayzantium's revolt 1s merition.0d in VIII, 80; her c()inage 
is treated 1n Head, ~., 263-268 and Poole, 93-105. 
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the Athenians. During the summer months they had already endured 
difficul ties with Samos, Thasos, and Byzantium; and now the fact 
that the large island directly to ~~e north of Attica was menaoed 
by rebellion urged them to action. It was at this time that they 
took definite steps towards a more stable government at horne, ex-
pelling the Four Hundred, reoalling Alciblades from exile, and 
setting up a new demooratio constitution, frequently referred to 
as the Constitution of Theral'llenes, which Thucydides praises 
highly.25 
The revolt on Euboea, however, was evid6ntly successful. 
Begi~xing in 411, a series of federal coinage began at Eretria 
which would continue down through the next oentury.26 
After the Euboean affair, Thucydides ends his narrative 
swiftly with two rays of hope for the Athenian cause. Shortly 
after this event, an Athenian fleet won a naval battle at Cynos-
sema, whioh greatly raised the spirits of the people.27 Then 
Cyzious, whioh had ventured to revolt also, was repressed and 
fined. 28 Thus the historian closes his aocount of the fifth 
25The history of Euboea is treated in VIII, 95-96; Bury, 495-
496; c. A. H., V, 338. The Constitution of Theramenes can be 
dooumented In Aristotle's The Const!tution.2t: 2 Athenia.ns, XXIX-
XXXIII; it 1s mentioned by~ucydides in VIII, 97, 2. Confer also 
Steve1l8o:r!, If'l~e Constitution of Theramenes, n :ll!§., LVI (1936),48-5'7. 
':)' ~bThe coins of Euboea are described in Gardner, ~., 247; 
Head, lQ~., 355-357. 
27Cynossema is treat~d in VIII, 104-105; Bury, It96;Q.A.g.,V 341-342. 
?8 
"- 'Cyzicus 1s mentioned in VIII, 107. T'ne bri'ef freedom of 
the city did not l"esult 1n any ooin chanp:e. 
century with two Athenian victories against the dim background 
of a decaying Empire. 
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By way of brief summary of the evidence in thl s ch:1pter, we 
might mention the following data. The Syracusan expedition left 
its mark on the coinage of Sicily: in the gold "necessi tylt money 
and in the later sIlver commemorative coins of Syracuse ltself, 
in the altered styles of the currency of Catana and Sst';esta. 
The greater part of the long list of the allies in VII, 51 was 
ve~ified through a brief perusal of their coinage. Decelela, 
of course, had no immediate effect on Athenian money; but it 
would a few years later, when the reserves on the Acropolis would 
run out in 408/7. 
Among the towns in revolt in 412 and 411, we coUld trace de-
finite influences in the coinage of Ch10s, enidua, Cyme, .A.bydus, 
Samos, Thasos, Byzantium, and Euboea. Rhodes did not begin to 
Issue untIl after a few years had passed. Furthermore, resump-
tion in Cyme (and also in Ephesus) helps us to fill in Thucydldes' 
account, which is probably quite selective in this description of 
the disIntegration of the Empire. And, while the evidence Is not 
always as clear or as full as we might like it to be, still it 
in no way contradicts the account of the historian. 
CH#lPTER VI 
THE VALIDITY OF' THUCYDIDES I ANALYSIS OF THE MORALITY O~~ THE 
A THElIIAN BMP IRE 
x't'T)(.ul 't'! eC; are ~ ll.aAAov 11 aywv, 0i1a. 
ec; 't'0 nQPa.xp~~a. «xoueav ~uyxe''t'a,. 
--Thucydides, I, 22, L~. 
We have 110W' completed our discussion of the his tor:: of the 
Athenian Empire as related by Thucydides and as reflected in 
numislna tics .We therefore wish to return once aga.in to the 
problem posed in chapter one and try to solve it in the light of 
the historical evidence seen thus far. In the present chapter, 
then, we will attempt to answer three chief questions revolving 
around our problem: (1) was Thucydides' approach to the Athenian 
Empire completely objective or did his literary flair l~ad him to 
omit certain facts which were historically pertinent; (2) in the 
narratIVe does such historical necessity appear as would actually 
force the Athenians to take the COl~se of action that they did 
and hence validate their moral apologia; and (3) were the proposed 
Athenian views on morals actually shared by Thucydides. These 
three main points will constitute the material of this chapter. 
To a.nswer the first question on Thucyd:ldes' objectivity, we 
need not spend much time in re-reviewing the history of the Ern-
pire. We need only remnrk that in our present study we have in 
or:;' 
general uncovered a surprising amount of substantiation for 
Thucydides' narrative. We have been able to find numismatic 
affirmation for roughly eif.hty-five percent of the incidents 
mentioned by the historian; and many of the other events, such 
as the assemblies at Sparta in 432 and the capture of small cities 
like Plataea, ivere not likely to leave their mark upon coinage. 
On the other hand, we nowhere ran across any contradiction between 
Thucydides and co inage. except for a 8 eaming dlrrj.cul ty when 
Melos' name appeared on the revised A.thenian tribute lists from 
425. Our main coneeI'n at this point is with those events that 
numismatics has reI ated anel 1Ih ichI'hucydides has for some reason 
or other omitted from his account. Among such facts are the 
capture of Lycia and Ep~esus in or around 469 and their revolt 
around 413. the transfer of the Delian treasury to Athens in 454. 
the Decree of Clearchu8 in 449. the softening of the imperial 
policy in the northern regions around 439. the greatly increased 
tribute in 425, and the revolt of Cyme in 412. 
Why d 1d Thucydides le ave these events out of his narra ti ve? 
We cannot. of course, pen~trate to his subjective reasoning in 
this matter; bu t we must attempt to approximate his thoughts on 
the subject. We will never know for certain '.vh.etlJ.er the omissions 
were intentional or not. We must satisfy ourselves with stating 
simply that he mip;ht he. ve or should have known about these facts 
and the. t he might have or should have included them 1n his account. 
Before attempting a subjective analysis. however, let us 
take a brief look at the omitted matter itself. A certain 
amount of it can be designated as irrelevant before we begin 
our inquiry. The gain and loss of Lycia and Ephesus in the 
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fifth oentury- would hardly be considered of first-rate strategio 
importance, and Thucydides should not be expeoted to include the 
acquisition of every city in his narrative. But it may be argued 
that he mentions the capture of Eion, Scy-ros, and Carystus just 
before the original date of the fall of Ephesus. These cities, 
however, were brought into the narrative for a special reason--
not because of their own relative importance, but because of 
their significance as steps in the transition from confederacy 
to empire, the first steps in an ever-changing policy- of the Athe-
nians. 
Bor similarly would the revolt of C;yme be of major importance. 
And actually-, as noted above on p_ge 90, we oannot say that Thucy-
dide. entirely neglects the fall of Cyme, since he definitely 
implies it in a later passage. Also, the changing of the im-
perial polioy in the Tbraoian area in 439 was not widespread in 
its effects) the right of coinage was probably restored to less 
than ten cities (we know of four). The historian could scarcely 
be blamed tor leaving out events like these. 
But the other three omissions are not a8 easy to explain 
away, because ot their relative importanoe. The transfer of the 
treasury, the decree of 449, and the sweeping alterations in the 
tribute .ere signifioant events in the history of the EmpIre. 
'Why should Thucydides choose to neglect them? A variety of 
answers could be proposed, some of which we have already seen. 
Vlere the events in th~mselves too well known so that a re-
tellinp: of them would seem almost banal? This is highly doubt-
rule Thllcydides does not fail to recount other well-known in-
cidents,as the rJolian attack and the steee of Syracuse. A his-
torian is not incl ined to oni t an e vent because it is too im-
portant. 
The most obvious answer to tho problem is the one that 
Cornford and his associates prefer, namely that Thucydides 
leaves these events out because they do not fit in with his pro-
posed scheme--a eulogy of Athena' former greatness. Yet would 
any man who was trying to cove~ up Borne of the more savory de-
tails of his country's past go to the trouble of relating the 
many massacres and depopulations perpetrated by his nation? 
Would he allow the leading states,man of his land and the chief 
founder of the Empire to refer baldly to that institution as 
"tyranny,,?l Would he portray such inhumane and uncivilized 
passions in his glorious people as he puts into the mouths o.f 
tho Athenian spokesmen in the eel ebrated Melian d ialor:ue?2 A 
man attempting to enlist the sympath1es of his hearers for t:1S 
Empire would hardly enliven his narrative with these choice 
lConfer note 1, page 1. 
2Confer F. Wassermann, ttThe Melian Dialogue, II Transaotions .2; 
the American Philological Association, LXXVIII (1947), 18-36. 
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morsels. 
Or perhaps we might say in answer to our question on these 
omissions that Thueydides' critical sense was deficient. It is 
qu i te plaus i ble tha t a. man who exercised good .1udr:ment in mas t 
cases should err 1n some few, that he should fail to see the re-
lative significance of an occas10nal recent occurrence. 
This answer 1s possible, but I believe tha.t another is 
slightly more probable. If we look once more at the three events 
left out of Thucydides' acoount, we cannot help noticing that 
they are all of a type: the transfer of the treasury, a decree 
touohing chiefly on the issue of currency, and a statement of in-
coming revenues. The very fact that all these omissions touch 
on money in same form or other, as ml~ht be suspected from the 
nature of our previous inquiry in chapters two through five, 
might give us a clue to their absenoe. I say a clue beoause I 
do not believe, as Sutherland suggests,) that Thucydldes'is ob-
livious of all financial happenings or motives. T'hucydides pro-
bably omitted them because he felt that his was a primarily mili-
tary history and that these particular events did not have any 
bearing on the military; but this answer is not entirely satis-
factory. Thucydides at times pays much attention to other 
small finano1al deta1ls4 wh10h had even less military relevance 
30. B. V. Sutherland, "Corn and COin, Ill. Note on Greek Com-
meroial Monopolies, It Amer1 o.~n Journal £t Philolorul, LXIV (19+3),146. 
4Confer Appendix I. 
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than tMse.S 
We must, unfortunately, content ourselves with this attempt 
at solution. We can at best surmise Thucydtdes' subjective 
reasona, and it 1s better in such caS6S not to indulge in liter-
ary fantasles in attempting to describe a further resolut1on 
than that w8,l'lranted by the evidence. We may safely Bay that the 
historian might have been more accurate, had he set down theae 
events, and he undoubtedly knew them, as would any Athenian citi-
zen who oould read the atone tablets set up on the Acropolis. 
But I hardly believe that .e would be justified in saying that 
he omitted them because they dId not fit In with his preconceived 
apologetic notions. 
Oan .e make any defin1te conclusions from our present study? 
CertaInly eight y-f l' ve· percent IUbstantiation from a non-literary 
f1eld would •• em to lndicate something. Yet it does not say that 
s,,1th regard to thelle omissions, Gomme 1n his oommentary 8.,8 (I J 370) tha t the trans tel' 0 r the tre.sury .... "a measure 
which moft clearly thafl any other marked the ohange from the slm-
pIe leader.hip, rrrE(.l.OY&a, to the :rule, apx~, of Athena over tbe 
membera of the leagus." Yet he orfe-r8 no explanatlon for '!'huc,.-
d1d •• ' enaaloD, except that it 18 con.iatoent wi th the method 
1n the reat or the work--an unlikely solution, sinoe Thucydldes 
f'ltequent17 made .nt10n or smallex- financial details. 
Gonmte alao calla 'l'hucyd1des' neglect or the trIbute chang.s 
1n 42> "tm.e .tl'ange8t of all amissiona 1n 1hucydid ••• " (III, ,$00) 
But he thinks that this omission may be due to the fact that 
'rhuc1dld •• had not returned to Athena between the t1me of the 
ohanges and his exlle the next ,.ear and may not have been able to 
obtam any exact figure •• 
This solution, howev8-r, seems inadequate to me. If Thuc:r-
dides waa camposing hi. work atter 404--and 1t seems evident 
tt-Om the tut cited .a:rller that he was--then he would have had 
ace ••• to a~ such recorda at Athena. .0 the dIfficulty remains. 
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Thucydides 1s infallible, simply because we have ~~n across no 
unresolvable conflict between our two lines of evidence. Our 
conclusion should lIe somewhere in the middl a, but, because of 
the rela ti vely high percentage, more towards the side of his ob-
jectivity. It would not be an entirely unfounded supposition 
were we to state as a result of this excursus that Thucydldes 
was obj ecti ve in discussing mos t of the circumstances surrounding 
the question of the Athenian Empire. We would not wish to canon-
ize the historian, however; for he is by no means perfect. He 
has been known to omit pertinent data. He has made decided mis-
takes.6 And he at times takes little pains to conceal his un-
qualified admi~ation for such men as Pericles. But he is, by 
and large, objective; and, consequently, we can safely and reason 
ably answer our first ques tioll in the affirma ti va. 'l~lUcydides 
was fundamentally a sound historian, and his literary urge did 
not run away with h1m. 
The answer to our second quos tion, namely that regarding 'the 
necessity in the circumstances attendant on the origin, growth, 
and continuance of the empire, need not detain us long. As we 
have previously seen in the i'irst chapter, the type of necessity 
that th., Athenian envoys at Sparta. were talking about was scarce-
ly necessity in the strict sanse of an unalterable extrinsic 
determination to one course of action. It was rather pragmatic 
6E•g ., with regard to the geography of Sphacteria. Confer 
Gomme 's cornman tary, III, h 84. 
r 
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neoessity or expedienoy, a compulsion induoed by motives of fear, 
honor, and self-interest. This expediency was obviously pre-
sent throughout the history of tile Athenian Empire. It was to 
the advantaee of the Athenians to assume the proffered leadership 
at the beginning of the oonfedsraoy in 478/7. They certainly 
profited by the military aot1 vi ties of the confederacy, sharing 
in the spoils alonR with the.tr fellow members. It was to their 
interest to l{eep possible insubordinates in line and to retain 
their firm hold on the mole confederacy; hence it was deoidedly 
exp~dient to punish seve~~ such would-be secessionists as the 
Naxians and the Thasians. 
We could review the history of the Empire at I ength and in 
great detail, pointing out :tn each event what was to the advantage 
of the Athenians. Once they possessed their Empire and even the 
shadow of a Dolian confederacy was at an end, they had aroused 
t.1-).e ire of many of their subjects; and they were afraid" to let 
go, as Perioles and the Athenian envoys at Sparta admitted. 
This was their necessity. It was present throughout the career 
of' the Empl1re, gui ding the hand of the Athenians, directing them 
in whatever course of action was to their advantage. We may be 
misled by the terminology, since expediency hardly seems philos-
ophical necessity to us. But, granted the positivist morality 
expressed e.::r eady in chapter one as a foundation for the apologia 
of the Athenians, we cannot gainsay their excuses for tyranny 
wlt~out entering into the philosophical realm and proceeding be-
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yond the scope of our thesis. llaturally the AthenIans conducted 
their affairs of government to their own pragrn..atic advantage, 
sinoe many of tl16m no longer believed In any other standard of 
'1lOrallty. The expediency wh:!.ch ;~ulded them was, of cQurse, pre-
sent in the historical e vents; and these h.1."Joorieal events were 
faltllfully related by Thucydfdes. And so presclnding fram the 
Athenian deterministio theory of morals, we must pass on their 
apolor1a as valid. The exped~,ency 0];1 necessIty of history was 
whllt drove thom to take the course of' action which they did. 
One !'!lore question 1'enBins to be answered. Did Thucydi.des 
agree wi t 1" the moral criteria the. t !le put into t:be speec~es of 
his contemporary Athenians? Is the determin1stic moral analysis 
that~.ls hismrically valid actually his own? 
Let us quote a well-kno',m pa.ssage from the ttl lrd bool:: o.f 
his history. He ia here rf~f6rring to tho difficulties in Corcyra 
In 427 B.C •• and his referenc*,s to the n code of human rtf ture lt 
are hardly complImentary. 
At this cris1s, when th~ life of the oity ha.d been thrown 
into utter oonfUsion, human nature, now trlQ~ph~~t over 
the laws, and accustomed even in sp1te of the laws to do 
wrong, took deli,C!h t in showing that its pass10ns wero un-
governable, that it was stronger than justice and an 
enemy to all superiority. POl" surely no man would have 
put revenge before relif?1on, and gain before innocence 
of wrong, had not envy swayed him with her blighting 
power. Indeed, '!!len do not hesl tate, when they s~ek to 
avenge themselves UP-)rl others, to abrogate in ad~,m.nce 
the common princ1ples observed ~,n suoh c9.ses--t!'lOse 
principles upon which depends overy 1?tan' sown ;'lOpa of 
sal vat ion should he hlm..'H,lf be overtaken by misfortune--
thus failing to leave them in force at~ainst the t:tme 
when perchance a nq,n in peril shall have need of soml') 
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one of them.7 
We would base our whole argument on this citation. extolling as 
it does the laws of religion and universal char:i.ty. But. un-
happily textual difficulties enter into consideration here. 
Nearly all recent critical texts reject this chapter of the 
third book as spurious, and scholiast traditions ~oinG back as 
far as Dionysius of Hallcarnassus support this contention. Suf-
fice it to say that some modern commentators, e.g. SCJ;1wartz and 
Adcock,8 have accepted the passage; and we wis''led to clte it 
here as a point from which to begin our brief argumentat1.on on 
this matter, rather than as an authority in itself. 
Instead we shall base our conclusions on '1'hucydides' views 
of morality on a number of other texts, all of which are safe 
critically. Beginning with the eighty-second and eighty-third 
chapters of the third book, which immediately precede the passage 
quoted above, we find much of the same flavor of commentary upon 
the war morals of the time. l'hucydides descries the s piri t of 
revenR6 and dace! t a.broad in the c1 ty at war; he r ef'ers to 
greed and ambition as the cause of t..~ese evils. He bewails the 
prevalent depravity, the loss of simplicity, which he regards as 
"the chief element of a noble nature,tt9 and the broken oaths of 
711I, 84, 2-3. 
80lted in Gamme, II, 3q3. 
9111, 8), 1. 
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stat.smen. Though he 1s explicitly declaiming only on the 
savagery evident in a city during internal dissension, he implies 
that these observations belong to all states and individuals in 
time of war. 10 
We have frequently adverted to the Melian dialogue, that 
forthright expression of an overweening imperial power. The 
Athenian speeches throughout this section of the history are 
couched in terms which le_ve an unmistakable impression of pride 
and brutality. They offer the Melians the alternative of becom-
ing imperial subjects of their own accord or of meeting the1r 
death under overwhelming force.. And, as sole excuse for this 
barbarous conduct, the Athenians allege,nFor of the gods we hold 
the beliet, and of men .e know, tnat by a nece.sity ot their 
nature wherever they have power they always rule."ll And so, 
presuming on future divine tavor in spite of their m18deed.,12 
the Athenian. go down to disaster 10 the Syracuaan exped1tion, 
, 
which beg1ns in the very next chapter after the cloae ot the 
Melian episode. 
We might say that such orude sentiment. seem to be attri-
buted espeoially to the member. of the war party at Athens. All 
through the fourth and fifth booka, Cleon, the leader of this 
lOllI, 82, 3. 
11y, 105, 2. 
12y , 10$, 1. 
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party, Is portrayed as a vulgar demagogue and an unscrupulous 
agItator. Then, after his death at Amphipolis, the war party 
succeeds in violating the truce by attacking Meloa in 416 and ex-
pressing their contemptuous sentiments as above. FInally, in 
the sixth book, It is likewise this party, with Alcibiades as 
prime mover, who convinoes the Athenian people of the wisdom 
of the Sicilian expedition, which finally weakened the power of 
Athena .0 seriously that her Aegean subjects could revolt almost 
with impunl ty • 
On the other hand, IUcias, the leader of the peace party, 
1. generally painted aa a vlrtuous man, though a somewhat lrre-
aolute general. He tighta doggedly to forestall the sending of 
the fleet to Sicl1y; and, when eventually he loae. his life In 
that oampaign, he ia mourned by Tbuoydides as va man who, of all 
the aellene. of my time, least d.served to me.t with such a ca~ 
lamity, because ot hla oour.e ot lit. that had been wholly re-
gulated inaooordanee with virtue."l) And, as Thuoydides himself, 
admits, .icias' virtue •• eem hardly to have been military in 
charaoter. 
On these considerations as well aa on those of language em-
ployed at other places in the narrative, e.g., when the historian 
r.fers to the suppression of the revolt of Naxos as being termin-
ated x~pd ~& X4e£a~~x&' 'OOUA~~ (soarcely oomplimentary terma), 
l)VII, 86, $. 
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I would say that Tbucydides t sympathies did not lie with the new 
agg~essive mo~ality. Throughout his work he gives the Athenian 
ca.e a fair hearing, but I do not believe that he agreed with 
them in principle. Despite his objective po~trayal of the new 
morality, he seems to have preter~ed the old religious standards. 
In conclusion, let us make a few remarks on the significance 
of this thesis. We do not propose to claim that we have settled 
without a doubt the problems discussed in the course of these 
chapters. It would r.qu1~e a doctorate dissertation, for instance 
to delve fully into such topics as the deterministic mo~ality or 
the necessitarian theory of history in the pages of Thucydides; 
and we have just touched lightly on these questions wherever it 
has been neceDsa~ to b~ing them into ou~ discussion. But our 
contact with the non-literary science of numismatics has allowed 
us to become reasonably sure of Thucydides' objectivity in deal-
ing wi th the history of the Athenian Empire, in so far a'. external 
evidence can tell the story. Our very slight contact with the 
positivist moral philosophy of the Athenian war party has led us 
to appreciate their attempted defense of their position on the 
grounds of historical neceSSity. And, finally, we have caught a 
faint glimpse into mind of Thucydides himself on t his whole ques-
tion of morality and history and have seen that his personal 
views on the matter, while not prejudicing his objective account 
of the Athenian pride and ~uin, seem to lie on the side of the 
old ~eligious standards of virtue. But it would be foolish to 
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cla1m that we have settled these questions beyond the shadow of 
a doubt. We but point out general tendencies Which we think are 
significant and keep an open mind for the ever-increasing evi-
denoe which scholarship is building up in classical fields. 
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APPENDIX I 
THUCYDIDES' INTEREST IN FINANCIAL QUESTIONS 
This appendix 1s not intended to be a polemio. I do not 
propose to refute Professor Sutherland's views l on Thucydides' 
orass neglect of oommercial motives in the Peloponnesian War. 
I wish merely to state positively certain aspects under which 
the historian brings up finanoial matters and to recount brief-
ly some ot his more oharacteristic statements on the subjeot. 
Thus this appendix will not be a complete oatalogue of all the 
instanoes in which Thucydides mentioned anything conneoted with 
moneYJ nor will it be a damnation of previous opinions on the 
subject. It will serve simply as a faint indioation that the 
historian was not entirely ignorant of the important par,t tha t 
finance pI ays in the waging 0 r any war. 
In the quotation from Thucydides cited at the beginning ot 
ohapter four, we found Archidamus, the aged Spartan king, saying, 
"War i. not so muoh a matter of arms as or money •••• "2 And, 
throughout the pages of the history, we find this statement re-
eohoed countless times. The Trojan war was insignifioant, com-
lConrer page 99. 
2Page S8; I, 83, 2. 
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pared with the Pe1oponnesian War, "because of lack of money."3 
Similarly the conflict beginning in 432 was destined to be so 
great because both Sparta and Athens and their respective allies 
were at the height of their power, though Thucydides carefully 
distinguishes between the relative poverty of Sparta financially 
and the fiscal reserve built up by the Athenians throu~~ their 
system of tribute.4 Pericles remarks that "it is accumulated 
wealth ••• that sustains wars."5 And, for these reasons, the 
Athenians should have been able to overcome the Spartans. 
During the account of the war itself, both sides see that 
the success of the Athenian cause depends upon the revenues 
coming regularly from the subject cities of the Empire, as well 
as trom Athens' own silver mines at Laurium. 6 To stop this flow 
of money, the Spartans fortify Deceleia in 413 and succeed in 
impoverishing Athens to some extent by cutting off her native 
supply ot si1ver.7 In the olosing year8 ot the narrative, the 
Spartans make a treaty with the Persians; and one ot the express 
purposes of the paot is to prevent the tribute money from reaoh-
r1 
ing Athens.~· These taotics are eventuallY successful and help 
31, 11, 2. 
41, 19; I, 80, 4; I, 85, 1; I, 141, 2-4; I, 142, 1. 
51, 141, .5. 
6 II, 13, 2J VII, 19, 1. 
7VII, 27, 3-5 and 28, 4. 
SVIII, lA, 1. 
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considerably toward the downfall of the city at a later date. 
As the power of Sparta grows in the years narrated by the 
eighth book, her resources grow as well. She begins to levy 
tribute from her followers for the prosecution ot' the war, even 
If they are unwilling. 9 And she is soon enriched by assessments 
whieh seem to exceed even those of Athens in her prime. lO 
Throughout the course of the war, the historian frequently 
remarks on the relative wealth or poverty of a city. He describes 
the destitution of the Syracusans under siege at some length. ll 
He refers to the opUlence of Selinus and Syraouse before the be-
ginning ot the Sioilian campaign.12 The concealed poverty of 
Segestal ) 1. one of the main t'actors which leads to the vanquish-
ment ot' the Athenian forces In the West. And, at various times, 
he mentions the wealth of suoh peoples as the Carthaginians,14 
the Odrysl&ns,15 and the colonists at Amphipolis. l6 
Partl cular sums ot' money are recorded over twenty t'imes in 
9vIII, ), 1-2. 
10VIII, 44, 4, where thirty-two talents are taken from 
Rhodes. 
llVII, 48, 5. 
l2VI , 20, 4. 
13VI, 46, 1. 
14vI, 34, 2. 
15I1, 91, ). 
16rv , 108, 1. 
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~he narrative. For example, Thucydides tells us that the first 
.ssessed tribute of the Delian confederacy amounted to 460 tal-
ents.17 Then he gives in detail the financial condition of the 
~thenian treasury in 431, where be lists reserves amounting to 
6000 talents in coined silver an.d numerous other sources of pre-
cious meta.ls, such as the temple vessels and the plates on the 
statue of Athena, on the Acropolis.18 He notes that 1000 talents 
of this monGY was later set aside as an emergency fund. 19 Occa-
siona.lly too, he gives us exact figures on such events as the 
siege of Potidaea, which COlt 2000 talents. 20 or the property 
tax of 428, which netted 200 talents.21 Tiny iterna of interest 
are also recorded at times, such as when Brasidas otters thirty 
silver mnas to the first man to soal. the wall of Leoythus22 or 
when the Argive.amss a popular profIt of twenty-five talents 
from selling the booty taken from the Spartans at Thyreatis. 23 
We have already mentioned the heavy reliance of th~ Athenians 
upon the tribute. Thuoydides disousses the Athenian tribute 
171, 96. 2. 
1811• 13, 3-5. 
1911. 24, 1. The emergenoy came in VIII, 15, 1. 
201 I, 70, 2. 
21 III, 19. 1. 
22IV, 116, 2. 
23 VI, 95, 1. 
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policy in the first book and tells how the main aim of the im-
perial city is to reduce all their allies to dependent, tribute-
paying subjects.24 Sometimes he descends to s~ch homely details 
as the ships which sailed around collecting the trlbute. 25 
Nor does he neglect the financial status of the. indIvidual. 
He refers to his own right towor¥ the gold mines near Amphipo-
li8.26 He mentions the great personal wealth of Nicias and the 
Corinthians' fear that he will bribe his way fre~.27 In several 
instances he tells us that the pay for the average soldier or 
sailor in Athenian employ was one drachma daily, Which was twice 
the salary of a contemporary juror in the Athenian law courts. 28 
He states that the average amount necessary to maintain a war-
ship for a month was one talent. 29 And at least twice he cites 
the exact amount levied by fine: ten tho~and drachmas against 
King Agis, the Unsuccessful Spartan general,30 and two thousand 
mnas demanded from the Lacedaemonians for violating Eli. durln~ 
an Olympic truce.31 
241, 96,1; I, 99. 3. 
2$ IV , 7$. 
26IV, 10$, 1. 
27VII, 86, 4. 
28111, 17, 2) VI, 31, li VII, 27, 1-2. 
29vI, 8, 1. 
JOy, 6), 2. 
31v, 49, 1. 
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'l'hucydldes even mentions differont standards of' m.oney. IIe 
relates a quarrel between the Persians and the Spartans as to 
whether the Peloponnesian sailors should be paid one Attic 
drachma per day.32 Corinth asks her citizens who wish to make 
a deposit for one of her colonies, but do not wish to go in per-
son to make a down payment of fifty Corinthian drachmas--hardly 
a surprising standard.33 The Athen1ans are said to have purchase 
Rhoeteum, a city in Asia Minor, for two thousand Phocaean staters 
from the Mitylenian exiles.34 And the Chians pay the members of 
the Spartan fleet which have assisted them three Chian tessara-
costs per man.3.? 
Except for the general statements with regard to the 1m-
portanoe of money towards the war effort, many of these citations 
from Thucydides have little or no significance in themselves. 
But they do serve to show that the historian was not entirely 
oblivious of money matters and that, although he may haNe omitted 
financial facta from his narrative in which we would be mu~~ more 
interested, this was not done because he had ruled the Whole sub-
ject of money out of his history. And it is only fair to Thuey-
dides to remark in conclusion that many more sundry ex~~ples of 
financial events could be quoted from the pages of his account. 
32VI11, 2.9, 1. 
331, 27, 1. 
34 IV, 52, 3. 
35v111, 101, 1. 
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